Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Debord v. Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014) (No. 13-1118), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1120 by Schnapper, Eric & Buchanan, Mark A.
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Court Briefs Faculty Publications
3-13-2014
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Debord v. Mercy
Health System of Kansas, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2664
(2014) (No. 13-1118), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1120
Eric Schnapper
University of Washington School of Law, schnapp@uw.edu
Mark A. Buchanan
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-court-briefs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Court Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric Schnapper and Mark A. Buchanan, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Debord v. Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2664
(2014) (No. 13-1118), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1120 (2014) https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-court-briefs/28
1ÍL-1118 
Supreme Court, U.S. 
FILS) 
MAR 1 3 20tt 
UM-tv« v.r i rte OLbl-y* 
ïïn Wí)t 
Supreme Court of tlie fKntteb States 
 ♦  
SARA C. DEBORD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM OF KANSAS, INC., 
Respondent. 
 ♦  
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari 
To The United States Court Of Appeals 
For The Tenth Circuit 
 ♦  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 ♦  
Eric Schnapper* 
University of Washington 
School of Law 
P.O. Box 353020 
Seattle, WA 98195 
(206) 616-3167 
schnapp@u. washington.edu 
Mark A. Buchanan 
Law Office of Mark A. Buchanan 
712 Broadway, Suite 100 
Kansas City, MO 64105 
(816) 221-2288 
Counsel for Petitioner 
*Counsel of Record 
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
i 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 forbids an employer to retaliate against any 
employee because that worker "opposed" unlawful 
discrimination. The question presented is: 
Does section 704(a) prohibit retaliation against a 
worker because of the worker's statements: 
(1) only when the statements are made to 
the worker's own employer or to federal or 
state anti-discrimination agencies (the rule 
in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits), or 
(2) also when the worker's statements are 
made to any other person (the rule in the 
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits)? 
ii 
PARTIES 
The petitioner is Sara C. Debord. The respondent 
is the Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc. 
iii 
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1 
Petitioner Sara C. Debord respectfully prays that 
this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals entered on November 26, 2013. 
 ♦  
OPINIONS BELOW 
The November 26, 2013 opinion of the court of 
appeals, which is reported at 737 F.3d 642 (10th Cir. 
2013), is set out at pp. la-34a of the Appendix. The 
March 20, 2012 opinion of the district court, which is 
reported at 860 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Kan. 2012), is set 
out at pp. 35a-73a of the Appendix. The January 16, 
2014 order of the court of appeals denying rehearing 
en banc, which is not reported, is set out at p. 74a of 
the Appendix. 
 ♦  
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered 
on November 26, 2013. On January 16, 2014, the 
court of appeals denied a timely petition for rehearing 
en banc. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
2 
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED 
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in pertinent 
part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees ... because he has opposed 
any practice, made an unlawful employment 
practice by this title, or because he has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceed- 
ing, or hearing under this title. 
 ♦  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case presents an important issue regarding 
the scope of section 704(a) of Title VII, which protects 
workers from retaliation because they "opposed" 
unlawful discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In 
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville 
and Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009), this Court 
adopted a broad view of when the content of an em- 
ployee's statement would constitute "opposition" to 
discrimination, and thus be accorded protection from 
retaliation. The statements in Crawford had been 
made by the plaintiff to her employer. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Alito noted that a distinct question 
regarding the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of 
Title VII would be raised by a statement about dis- 
crimination made by an employee to co-workers (or 
3 
others),1 rather than to his or her employer. 555 U.S. 
at 282-83. This case presents that issue. 
(1) From 2004 to 2009 Sara Debord worked in 
the radiology department of Mercy Hospital in Inde- 
pendence, Kansas ("Mercy"). Her supervisor through- 
out this period was Leonard Weaver, who was 
married to one of the hospital's chief surgeons. 
Weaver ... would often say to Plaintiff and 
her co-workers "feel my cold hands," then 
touch the employees' upper arms or the back 
of their necks. One employee told Weaver 
"don't touch me." ... [S]everal said, "your 
hands are cold, get them off me." Plaintiff's 
response was to pull away. Weaver would 
sometimes rub Plaintiff's back, and she 
would tell him "Stop, that hurts," although it 
didn't hurt. Weaver touched Plaintiff approx- 
imately three times a week. 
(App. 37a; see App. 3a). Three other female Mercy 
employees in the radiology department described 
being touched in this manner by Weaver. (App. 14a). 
"Weaver ... admitted to occasionally touching [Debord] 
and other employees on the arm to show them 
how cold his hands were." (App. 7a). "Weaver claims 
he was just trying to show [Debord] how unusually 
^ Ä statement made to the EEOC or a state or local anti- 
discrimination agency would at least ordinarily be protected by 
the-provision-of section 704(a) applying to participation in a 
proceeding under Title VII. 
4 
cold his hands were, but Debord says the touching 
was sexual harassment." (App. 3a). "Debord also says 
Weaver frequently made offensive sexual comments 
and advances, such as pulling down the neck of 
her shirt while she was leaning over a patient, asking 
her to show him her chest, and using sexually sugges- 
tive language when she wore certain clothing." (App. 
3a).2 
2
 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 13-14: 
In 2004, Weaver asked DeBord if he could see her 
breasts.... He asked her a half dozen times.... She said 
no.... In 2004, Weaver asked "If no one would ever find 
out would you ever consider sleeping with someone 
like me." ... DeBord said no.... In 2004, Weaver was 
assisting DeBord with laying down a patient and as 
DeBord was bent over toward Weaver, he pulled the 
neck of her shirt down to look down her shirt.... She 
said don't ever do that again.... In 2006, DeBord was 
wearing jeans and Weaver said "I didn't notice in 
scrubs but you have a really nice butt." ... DeBord re- 
sponded by never wearing jeans again.... In April 
2009, DeBord was shutting the door to change into 
her gym clothes and Weaver walked by and said "can I 
watch?".... In June, 2009, Debord was leaning over her 
computer and Weaver came up behind her and said 
"your butt looks good. I almost slapped it.".... DeBord 
said "don't ever do it".... This occurred one month be- 
fore her termination.... Weaver would sometimes rub 
DeBord's back and she would tell him that hurts and 
to stop even though it did not hurt. 
When a Mercy official asked Weaver whether he had remarked 
to a female employee that he "would like to slap" her on the 
bottom, Weaver "said he could not confirm saying that but he 
(Continued on following page) 
5 
On July 6, following an incident during which 
Weaver hugged her, Debord posted on her Facebook 
page her objection to Weaver's actions, commenting 
that Weaver "needs to keep his creapy [sic] hands to 
himself" (App. 4a-38a; CAApp. 284).3 Debord's Face- 
book page was accessible to her Facebook "friends," 
who included several co-workers.4 The parties disa- 
gree about whether such a communication to co- 
workers and friends is protected by section 704(a) a 
disagreement that tracks a well-defined split in the 
Courts of Appeals. Another posting that day stated 
that Weaver had improperly approved an overpay- 
ment to Debord. 
could not deny it either." (Court of Appeals Appendix ("CAApp.") 
599) (Brewster notes of interview with Leonard Weaver). 
3
 Q. And in your Facebook posts, when you said "creepy 
hands," were you intending to describe something 
other than cold hands? 
A. No. Just that it just gave me the creeps. I mean, 
it was such an everyday thing that it got to where I 
could be sitting somewhere and he would come into 
the area and I wouldn't even have to look, my skin 
would crawl. 
App. 39a; CAApp. 472. 
4
 CA App. 599 (Brewster notes of interview with Leonard 
Weaver): 
Leonard said [Debord] put inappropriate comments on 
FaceBook concerning him and was suspended for one 
day. Leonard said he had a copy. I asked him how he 
got a copy of her FaceBook page, didn't you have to be 
designated as a "friend" to access FaceBook. He then 
told me he received the copy from someone who had 
access to "FaceBook" as a designated "friend" to the 
co-worker FaceBook space. 
6 
At some point on July 6 Weaver learned that 
Debord had posted her complaint about his "creepy 
hands." Later that same day, when Debord was in a 
meeting with Mercy's Human Resources director, Eric 
Ammons, "Weaver interrupted the meeting to con- 
front Debord about the posts." (App. 5a). Debord, 
unwilling to confront her supervisor, initially denied 
having posted the complaints. Weaver ultimately left 
the room, but only after explicitly warning Debord - 
in Ammons' presence - "Be careful what you say, it 
will always come back to bite you." (CA App. 473). 
Ammons ordered Debord to take down her Facebook 
post about Weaver's "creepy hands," and she subse- 
quently did so. (CAApp. 473). 
On July 8, 2009, Ammons called Debord to his 
office and told her she was being suspended with- 
out pay for a day because of the disputed Facebook 
posts. The written reason for the suspension was as 
follows: 
Work related conduct needing improvement: 
Failure to conduct yourself in a manner con- 
sistent with a high degree of personal integ- 
rity and professionalism which is expected of 
Mercy co-workers. Engaged in behavior 
deemed harmful to a fellow co-worker. Sup- 
porting details: See attached Facebook Doc- 
uments. - During counseling Sara admitted 
posting information on Facebook. 
(App. 40a). The Facebook posts themselves were 
attached to the suspension notice. (CA App. 291-92). 
Also attached to the Corrective Action Form were two 
7 
pages from the Mercy printed "Standards of Conduct," 
on which Ammons had underhned the following passage: 
This [standard] not only involves sincere re- 
spect for the rights and feelings of others, 
but also encourages that both in your busi- 
ness and your personal life you refrain from 
any behavior that might be harmful to you, 
your co-workers, and/or Mercy. 
(CAApp. 289, 542). In Weaver's absence, Debord con- 
ceded to Ammons that she had posted the complaints 
on her Facebook page. (CAApp. 466). 
Prior to suspending Debord, Ammons did not ask 
her for any details about the "creepy hands" com- 
plaint or make any effort to ascertain whether Weav- 
er had indeed been touching Debord. 
After Ammons informed Plaintiff of her sus- 
pension, he asked Plaintiff about the "creepy 
hands" comment, and Plaintiff replied that 
Weaver was a "perv." Ammons asked what 
she meant by that, and plaintiff replied that 
Weaver had made comments about her body 
and would run his hands up inside the arm 
of her scrubs and down the back neck of the 
scrubs. 
(App. 40a) (Emphasis added). 
Later that same day, following her meeting with 
Ammons, Debord sent a text message to one of her 
female co-workers stating that "[Ammons] was calling 
the techs ... asking about [Weaver's] conduct ... the 
lewd comments and touching." (CA App. 302-03). 
Debord sent the message to that particular co-worker 
8 
"[bjecause she knew how Leonard [Weaver] was so I 
knew that she would understand."5 That co-worker 
had at an earlier time resigned because of Weaver's 
harassment, returning only on a part-time schedule 
that would permit her to minimize any contact with 
Weaver.6 That text message was one of the grounds 
later cited by Mercy to explain its decision to dismiss 
Debord. (CA App. 480). The parties disagree about 
whether the text message constituted protected 
activity. Mercy contends that after her meeting with 
Ammons, Debord also discussed the harassment with 
co-workers (CA App. 97),7 and cited those discussions 
as a basis for her dismissal. The parties also disagree 
about whether such discussions would be protected by 
section 704(a). These disagreements mirror the 
circuit split described below. 
On July 9 Debord was interviewed by a second 
Mercy official, and again described how she had been 
harassed by Weaver.8 That official subsequently 
5
 CAApp. 468. 
6
 CA App. 619 (worker repeatedly touched by Weaver's 
"creepy" hands), 620 (Weaver assaulted worker when she 
dropped off her daughter to babysit for him), 621 (worker 
resigned and returned to work only part time to avoid Weaver) 
(Walsh dep.). 
7
 Whether Debord had such discussions with her co-workers 
is disputed. 
8
 CA App. 597 (Brewster notes of interview with Sara 
Debord): 
I told Sara I had called her in to talk about a sexual 
harassment compl[ai]nt. She said she did not file out 
a sexual harassment compl[ai]nt. I asked if she had 
(Continued on following page) 
9 
interviewed only one other female employee in the 
radiology department.9 The official also met with 
Weaver, and indicated in her notes that Weaver 
"[wjanted to know when he was proven innocent what 
would we do with Sara [Debold]. I told him all co- 
workers at Mercy have the freedom to report what 
they perceive as harassment without any type of 
punitive damage. I don't believe he was happy with 
that response." (CA App. 599) (Brewster notes of 
interview with Leonard Weaver). 
Four days later, on July 13, 2013, Mercy dis- 
missed Debord. The written Statement of Discipli- 
nary Action provided only a short explanation of that 
verbalized a compl[ai]nt to HR. She said yes. I asked 
who it was against and she said Leonard Weaver. 
I asked her about the environment in the department. 
She said she really didn't know it was sexual harass- 
ment until someone told her and then she read up on 
sexual harassment on the internet and thought may- 
be it was. Sara started crying. I gave her a Kleenex. 
9
 CA App. 598 (Brewster notes of interview with Kim 
Harris): 
Did she feel the Radiology Department environment 
was hostile or any sexual tension in the department? 
Kim said she pretty much stayed to herself. The de- 
partment was pretty laid back and she wasn't in the 
clique. 
In the Department were there any lewd comments, 
etc. She said the department was pretty open, joked 
around, like most clinical departments, probably to let 
off tension. 
Kim brought up Sara and a FaceBook comment. I told 
her I wasn't looking into the Facebook issue. 
10 
action: "Inappropriate and disruptive behavior. Dis- 
honest." (App. 42a; CA App. 307). The dismissal 
notice also stated: "Dates of conduct needing im- 
provement: Information Received (7/6-7/10)." (CA 
App. 307). July 6 was the date on which Debord had 
posted on Facebook her complaint about Weaver's 
"creepy hands." (The 11th and 12th of July were a 
weekend). Ammons, who signed the notice of dismis- 
sal, told Debord that she was being dismissed in part 
because she had been "dishonest ... about the sexual 
harassment." (CA App. 480). Ammons informed 
Debord that the dismissal was also based on her 
actions in sending text messages to a co-worker 
referring to the investigation of her complaints con- 
cerning Weaver. (CA App. 543, 548, 668). 
(2) Debord filed suit in the district court, assert- 
ing that she had been dismissed in retaliation for 
actions protected by section 704(a) of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.10 After a period of discovery, 
Mercy moved for summary judgment. 
Mercy argued, inter alia, that Debord's Facebook 
post was not protected activity under section 704(a), 
because Debord had intended to communicate only to 
her Facebook "friends" her objection to Weaver's 
10
 Debord also asserted a claim that Weaver's actions had 
created a hostile work environment in violation of section 703(a) 
of Title VII. The lower courts rejected that claim on several 
grounds, and Debord does not seek review by this Court of the 
dismissal of her sexual harassment claim. (App. 10a-22a, 47a- 
58a). 
11 
"creepy hands," and had not acted with any purpose 
to notify her employer about the problems. "The Face- 
book posts are not protected opposition.... DeBord 
intended these posts only for her friends.... They are 
not protected activity. Hine v. Extremity Imaging 
Partners, ... 2011 WL ... 765853, at *9 (S.D.Ind. Feb. 
25, 2011) (griping with friends and co-workers is not 
statutorily protected activity)." Memorandum in Sup- 
port of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
23 (capitalization omitted). If, as Mercy contended, 
section 704(a) does not protect communications to 
"friends and co-workers," Debord's text message about 
Weaver would also be unprotected under section 
704(a), because it was sent to a co-worker, not to man- 
agement officials as would Debord's discussion with co- 
workers about the sexual harassment. 
The district court granted summary judgment 
without resolving whether the Facebook post, text 
message or discussion were protected activity. 
(3) On appeal the Tenth Circuit held that 
neither the Facebook post about alleged sexual har- 
assment nor the text message or discussion about 
that harassment were protected activity.11 
The court of appeals concluded that Mercy had 
offered six different "stated reasons" for terminating 
Debord: (1) "posting inflammatory material about her 
11
 Mercy contended, as it had in the district court, that 
nothing Debord had said or done in connection with the harass- 
ment was protected by section 704(a). Appellee/Cross-Appellant's 
Principal and Response Brief, 33 n.4. 
12 
supervisor on the internet," which included the 
complaint about Weaver's "creepy hands," (2) "dis- 
cussing the ... harassment investigation[] with 
others,"12 (3) "discussing the overpay ... investiga- 
tion[] with others," (4) "sending text-messages to co- 
workers bad mouthing her supervisor (unrelated to 
the alleged sexual harassment)," (5) "knowingly 
pocketing overpayment in 2007," and (6) "thrice lying 
about posting information on Facebook while at 
work." (App. 24a). Debord contended that the first 
and second of these "stated reasons" were facially 
unlawful; the court of appeals held that neither the 
Facebook post nor the text message to or discussions 
with a co-worker were protected by section 704(a). 
The Tenth Circuit rejected "Debord's ... argu- 
mente] • •• [that] Ammons could not lawfully termi- 
nate her for using Facebook to air her complaints." 
(App. 24a). In its initial decision to suspend Debord, 
Mercy had explained that her Facebook complaint 
about Weaver - her objection to being touched by his 
"creepy hands" - was being punished because it was 
"deemed harmful to a fellow-co-worker" (App. 40a); 
the "fellow co-worker" "harm[ed]" by the allegation of 
sexual harassment was, of course, the alleged sexual 
harasser. The court of appeals concluded that Mercy 
was entitled to punish Debord for such a statement 
on her Facebook page about Weaver. "She admits 
12
 The court of appeals' analysis encompassed both the text 
message and the asserted verbal communications about the 
harassment. 
13 
posting inflammatory material about her supervisor 
on the internet...." (App. 24a). The panel reasoned 
that Debord's "inflammatory" accusation of sexual 
harassment was not protected because it was made 
on Facebook, rather than being directed instead to 
Mercy's officials. "Her Facebook post was not in 
accordance with Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting 
system for sexual harassment complaints and the 
post, by itself, did not provide any notice to Mercy. 
Only when Weaver himself brought the post to 
Ammons's attention did Mercy learn that ... Debord 
disliked Weaver's 'creepy hands.'" (App. 26a). That 
was consistent with Mercy's contention that section 
704(a) only protects sexual harassment complaints 
directed to an employer itself, and not to "griping 
with friends and co-workers." 
The court of appeals also rejected "Debord's ... 
argument[] ... [that] Ammons could not lawfully 
terminate her for communicating with others about 
the pending investigations." (App. 24a). The panel 
concluded that Mercy was entitled to fire Debord if 
she violated a company policy that prohibited a victim 
of sexual harassment from disclosing the existence of 
any investigation of that harassment. The panel be- 
lieved that Mercy's policies indeed required Debord to 
remain silent about her harassment complaint. "She 
admits ... discussing the ... harassment investigations 
with others." (App. 23a). "[I]nstead of trying to gather 
evidence, Debord's text messages merely shared 
information with co-workers about an investigation 
that company policy dictates should be confidential.... 
and one period Mercy's confidential-investigation rule 
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was not generated after the fact. In fact, the rule is 
stated in Mercy's harassment training materials." 
(App. 29a). 
Because the court of appeals held that the Face- 
book post, the text message, and the discussion with 
co-workers were all unprotected by section 704(a), it 
did not reach the question of whether a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Debord would not have been 
fired but for those activities. 
The court of appeals, while rejecting Debord's 
claim that her Facebook post and text message were 
protected activity, also addressed a third issue, 
whether Debord had been dismissed for having 
directly told Mercy officials (in response to their 
questions) about the harassment. Mercy acknowl- 
edged that a complaint about sexual harassment if 
made directly to a company official could constitute 
protected activity, but denied having dismissed 
Debord because of the complaint made to Mercy 
itself. The Tenth Circuit noted that Mercy had articu- 
lated a number of lawful alternative reasons for the 
dismissal, not only the Facebook Post and text mes- 
sage (which the appellate court held were permissible 
reasons for firing Debord), but also several matters 
not related to the harassment.13 The court of appeals 
13
 Those other, non-harassment-related matters raised a 
number of factual disputes. For example, with regard to Mercy's 
original explanation that it had fired Debord for lying about 
having been overpaid, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged - as 
Mercy itself had by this point in the litigation - that there had 
indeed been such an overpayment. The court of appeals believed, 
(Continued on following page) 
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concluded that these various alternative reasons were 
not a pretext to cover up an intent to fire Debord 
because she had complained directly to Mercy. (App. 
22a-23a). 
Debord petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing 
that the panel had erred in holding that her Facebook 
post, text message and discussion about sexual har- 
assment - directed at friends or co-workers rather 
than to her employer - were not protected by section 
704(a). The court of appeals denied rehearing. 
 ♦  
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
Section 704(a) of Title VII protects workers from 
retaliation because they "opposed" unlawful discrimi- 
nation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In Crawford v. Metro- 
politan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 
this Court addressed the issue of what content of a 
worker's statement would constitute "opposition" to 
however, that Mercy's officials were simply unaware, when they 
assertedly fired Debord for allegedly lying about this matter, 
that their own records demonstrated there had been an over- 
payment. Mercy's reliance on this purported falsehood on the 
part of Debord, the appellate court believed, was merely the 
result of "negligence, forgetfulness or confusion - not intentional 
ignorance to hide a retaliatory motive," and did not demonstrate 
that Mercy actually was retaliating against Debord for having 
told Mercy officials directly about the harassment. 
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discrimination, and thus be accorded protection from 
retaliation. This case presents the distinct issue - 
noted but not directly resolved in Crawford - of 
whether section 704(a) protects statements made to 
persons other than a worker's own employer. 
Justice Alito noted in a concurring opinion in 
Crawford that "[t]he question whether the opposition 
clause shields employees who do not communicate 
their views to their employers through purposive 
conduct is not before us in this case; the answer to 
that question is far from clear; and I do not under- 
stand the Court's holding to reach that issue here." 
555 U.S. at 283. Justice Alito suggested in that opin- 
ion that applying section 704(a) to statements made 
to co-workers or friends would raise issues not posed 
by protecting statements to employers. 555 U.S. at 
282. Several circuit courts have noted that this Court's 
decision in Crawford left that issue unresolved.14 
Workers concerned about sexual harassment or 
other possible discrimination frequently discuss those 
issues with fellow employees, friends, relatives, or 
others. The question not posed by the circumstances 
in Crawford — but presented by the instant case - 
thus arises frequently. While serving on the Second 
and Third Circuits, respectively, then Judge Sotomayor 
wrote an opinion addressing that issue15 and then 
14
 Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 47 
(1st Cir. 2010); Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 
F.3d 804, 812 (2009) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S.Ct. 
863 (2011). 
15
 Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Judge Alito joined another such opinion.16 The same 
issue has been addressed by the lower courts under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,17 the 
Americans With Disabilities Act,18 and the Rehabilita- 
tion Act,19 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,20 
and Title IX.21 
I. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE SHARP- 
LY DIVIDED ABOUT WHETHER SECTION 
704(a) PROTECTS STATEMENTS BY A 
WORKER TO PERSONS OTHER THAN 
THE WORKER'S OWN EMPLOYER 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits hold that section 
704(a) does not protect statements made by a worker 
to persons other than the worker's employer, the view 
16
 Neiderlander v. American Video Glass Company, 80 
Fed.Appx. 256 (3d Cir. 2003). 
17
 Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 2012 WL 2521041 (D.Nev. 
June 27, 2012); Barber v. CSX Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 594, 
702 (3d Cir. 1995); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 
1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989); Chapin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 
2007 WL 915182 at *8 (S.D.Ohio March 26, 2007). 
18
 McMahan v. UMG Mfg. & Logistics, Inc., 2008 WL 
906152 (S.D.Ind. March 31, 2008). 
19
 Montanye v. Wissahickon School Dist., 218 Fed.Appx. 126, 
131 (3d Cir. 2007); Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 
F.Supp.2d 564, 580 (M.D.Pa. 2009). 
20
 Fields v. F airfield County Bd. of Developmental Disabili- 
ties, 507 Fed.Appx. 549 (6th Cir. 2012); Mondaine v. American 
Drug Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 626045 at *3 (D.Kan. Jan. 26, 2006). 
21
 Condiff v. Hart County School Dist., 770 F.Supp. 876, 882 
(W.D.Ky. 2011). 
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advanced in the courts below by Mercy. The First, 
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, on the 
other hand, hold that section 704(a) does apply to 
such statements. Debord's Facebook post and text 
message, and discussion of the harassment with co- 
workers, would have been protected activity if they 
had occurred in any of the six circuits that interpret 
section 704(a) more broadly. Whether a worker can 
safely discuss concerns about discrimination with co- 
workers or friends, indeed whether a victim of sexual 
harassment can even reveal that abuse to her or his 
spouse, depends on the circuit in which the worker is 
employed. 
(1) The Tenth Circuit held that Debord's Face- 
book post about sexual harassment was not protected 
by section 704(a) because it "was not in accordance 
with Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting system for 
sexual harassment complaints and the post, by itself, 
did not provide any notice to Mercy." (App. 26a). Sim- 
ilarly, the court of appeals concluded that Debord's 
text message and discussion about the sexual har- 
assment investigation were not protected because 
they "merely shared information with co-workers." 
(App. 29a). Those holdings were consistent with 
Mercy's contention that "griping with friends and co- 
workers is not statutorily protected activity." 
The Fourth Circuit adopted the same narrow 
interpretation of section 704(a) in Pitrolo v. County of 
Duncome, NC, 2009 WL 1010634 (4th Cir. March 11, 
2009). In that case, after the plaintiff applied for a 
county job, a county official "reported to Pitrolo that 
there was opposition to hiring her ... because of her 
19 
gender.... Pitrolo promptly informed her father ... of 
[the] statement; in response, her father contacted a 
[local business organization] and complained of dis- 
crimination.... Ultimately, the [county] learned about 
these allegations." 2009 WL 1010634 at *1 (footnote 
omitted). Pitrolo claimed that the county subsequent- 
ly rejected her application because she had reported 
the discriminatory remark to her father. The Fourth 
Circuit held that Pitrolo's complaint about discrimi- 
nation was not protected activity under section 704(a) 
because she had made her statements to her father, 
not to her prospective employer. 
Pitrolo's statements to her father do not 
qualify as protected activity under § 2000e- 
3(a). There is no evidence that Pitrolo in- 
tended for her father to pass along her 
complaints to Defendants.... Pitrolo did not 
communicate her belief to her employer and 
was not attempting to bring attention to the 
alleged discriminatory conduct. Instead, 
Pitrolo told her father of [the] statements be- 
cause she was "close to [her] father" and "it 
was something that was very important that 
was going on in [her] life at the time." ... As 
noted by the district court, it would not be 
reasonable to characterize a private com- 
plaint to a close family member as an "in- 
formal grievance procedure" under Laughlin 
[u. Metro Washington Airports Auth., 149 
F.3d 153, 259 (4th Cir. 1998)].... Since 
Pitrolo's statement to her father was not pro- 
tected activity, her retaliation claim fails. 
2009 WL 1010634 at *3 (footnote omitted). The 
Fourth Circuit relied on Justice Alito's assertion in 
20 
Crawford that the majority opinion in that case 
permitted such a limitation on the scope of section 
704(a). "We do not read Crawford ... to affect our 
analysis.... As Justice Alito noted, Crawford does not 
extend to cases where employees do not communicate 
their views to their employers through purposeful 
conduct." 2009 WL 1010634 at *3 n.6. Although the 
Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo is not officially 
reported, it has repeatedly been applied by district 
courts in that circuit.22 
(2) Six circuits hold to the contrary that the 
protection of the opposition clause in section 704(a) is 
not limited to statements made to a worker's own 
employer. 
The Second Circuit has concluded that 
[i]n addition to protecting the filing of formal 
charges of discrimination, § 704(a)'s opposi- 
tion clause protects as well informal protests 
of discriminatory employment practices, 
writing critical letters to customers, protest- 
ing discrimination by industry or by society 
in general, and expressing support of co- 
workers who have filed formal charges. 
Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899 F.2d 203, 
209 (2d Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit has repeatedly 
affirmed this rule that section 704(a) applies to 
complaints or other statements directed to persons 
22
 DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 2013 WL 5274505 at *7-*8 
(W.D.Va. Sept. 17, 2013); Harris-Rogers v. Ferguson Enterprises, 
2011 WL 4460574 at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011). 
21 
other than an employer's managers. Hubbard v. Total 
Communications, 347 Fed.Appx. 679, 679 (2d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Sumner); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 
202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (opinion by 
Sotomayor, J.); Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 78 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sumner)-, Heller v. Champion Int'l 
Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989); Grant v. 
Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d 
Cir. 1989) ("as this choice of language clearly indi- 
cates, Congress sought to protect a wide range of 
activity in addition to the filing of a formal complaint 
... [such as] writing a letter to a customer of employer 
... [or] boycotting and picketing of store...."). 
The Third Circuit noted that 
[w]e have previously ... cited with approval 
the Second Circuit's language in Sumner.... 
[P]ublic manifestations of disagreement with 
illegal employment practices can be protect- 
ed under the opposition clause.... [A] district 
court held that an employee, who attended a 
public meeting of students and parents orga- 
nized for the express purpose of challenging 
the allegedly discriminatory treatment of a 
black teacher, engaged in protected opposi- 
tion activity.... [In] Payne v. McLemore's 
Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 
(5th Cir. 1981) ... the Fifth Circuit upheld a 
district court conclusion that boycotting and 
picketing activity was protected conduct ... 
[because it] was directed at the employer's 
allegedly discriminatory employment prac- 
tice of withholding certain jobs from black 
employees. 
22 
Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, 
Del, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Neiderlander v. American Video Glass Company, 80 
Fed.Appx. 256 (3d Cir. 2003), an opinion joined by 
then Judge Alito, specifically rejected an employer's 
contention that section 704(a) does not protect an 
employee who complains to co-workers. 
Neiderlander told ... co-workers about her 
displeasure with [a disputed promotion deci- 
sion], alleging gender discrimination at 
AVG.... The District Court found that 
Neiderlander failed to establish the first 
prong of her prima facie case because her in- 
formal complaints of gender discrimination 
were directed to co-workers and not man- 
agement. The Court ... concluded that this 
did not constitute "protected activity." We be- 
lieve that this interpretation of protected ac- 
tivity is too narrow.... As established in 
Sumner, ... the opposition to discriminatory 
practices need not be made directly to man- 
agers in order to constitute protected activity, 
and Neiderlander's complaints to her co- 
workers, assuming they were communicated 
to management, would be the type of opposi- 
tion to discrimination that § 2000e-3(a) seeks 
to protect. 
80 Fed.Appx. at 260-61; see Hazen v. Modern Food 
Services, Inc., 113 Fed.Appx. 442, 443 (3d Cir. 2004) 
("informal complaints of discrimination that were 
directed at co-workers rather than management 
constitute protected activity"); Abramson v. William 
Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 287-88 
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(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sumner); Barber v. CSX 
Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 594, 702 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Sumner). 
The earliest appellate decision on this issue is in 
the Fifth Circuit, which held that section 704(a) 
protects complaints of discrimination directed to 
persons other than the employer. Payne v. 
McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 
1136-42 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The plaintiff in that 
case had organized a consumer boycott of several 
retail businesses, including the store where he 
worked on a seasonal basis, and was actively involved 
in picketing one of those stores. 654 F.2d at 1134-35. 
The boycott and picketing were directed at members 
of the public; their purpose was to oppose the employ- 
er's discrimination in hiring and promotion. Id. at 
1136. The district court held that the employer had 
violated section 704(a) by refusing to rehire Payne 
when it had vacancies, and the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1141. 
The Sixth Circuit has expressly endorsed the 
EEOC's interpretation of section 704(a) as extending 
to a worker's expression to anyone of opposition to 
unlawful discrimination. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Com- 
mission ... has identified a number of exam- 
ples of "opposing" conduct which is protected 
by Title VII, including complaining to anyone 
(management, unions, other employees, or 
newspapers) about allegedly unlawful prac- 
tices.... EEOC Compliance Manual, (CCH) 
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TI 8006.... Of critical import here is the fact 
that there is no qualification on who the in- 
dividual doing the complaining may be or on 
the party to whom the complaint is made 
known - i.e., the complaint may be made by 
anyone and it may be made to a co-worker, 
newspaper reporter, or anyone else.... 
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 
579-80 (6th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted); see Fields v. 
Fairfield County Bd. of Developmental Disabilities, 
507 Fed.Appx. 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2012) ("an employee 
may complain about discrimination to anyone") 
(quoting Johnson); Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, 
Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting John- 
son); Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 Fed.Appx. 562, 
571 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson); Niswander v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Johnson); Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of 
Nashville and Davidson County, 211 Fed.Appx. 373, 
375 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson), rev'd on other 
grounds, 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
In EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 
1008 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit expressly 
rejected the contention that section 704(a) protects 
only statements of opposition that are made to an 
employer itself. 
Zellerbach argues strenuously that [plain- 
tiff's] letter [objecting to discrimination], 
whatever its content, cannot constitute pro- 
tected opposition because it was delivered to 
... an outside party, rather than a Zellerbach 
25 
official. We find no persuasive authority to 
support the proferred position.... Where the 
recipient of the "opposition" message is an 
ordinary public official or a customer of the 
employer, Zellerbach maintains, the expres- 
sion is not statutory opposition. But [the 
Fifth Circuit decision in] Payne is to the con- 
trary. 
In that case, the plaintiff's opposition to 
discriminatory practices was expressed by 
participation in a boycott and in picketing 
designed to convey a message to customers 
and the public as well as the employer.... The 
court held that... the plaintiff... successfully 
demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimi- 
nation prohibited by the opposition clause of 
section 704(a).... 
720 F.2d at 1014. 
The First Circuit has adopted the same broad 
reading of section 704(a). Concetta v. National Hair 
Care Centers, Inc., 236 F.3d 67 (1st. Cir. 2001). "Ex- 
pressing opposition to harassment to management ... 
or 'anyone else/EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II.B.2 
(May 20, 1998) is protected conduct...." 236 F.3d at 76; 
see Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 32 
(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Sumner). 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED 
INCORRECTLY AN IMPORTANT QUES- 
TION OF FEDERAL ANTI-RETALIATION 
LAW 
The Tenth Circuit decision in the instant case 
and the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo are incon- 
sistent with this Court's decision in Crawford. Al- 
though the statements at issue in Crawford had been 
made to the worker's employer, Crawford's broad 
definition of "oppose" was not limited to statements 
made to any particular person. " 'Oppose' goes beyond 
'active, consistent' behavior in ordinary discourse, 
where we would naturally use the word to speak of 
someone who has taken no action at all to advance a 
position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were 
known to 'oppose' slavery before Emancipation, or are 
said to 'oppose' capital punishment today, without 
writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resist- 
ing the government." 555 U.S. at 277. The require- 
ment that an individual's objection to some action be 
"disclos[ed]" is satisfied without regard to the identi- 
ty of the person to whom the disclosure is made. Most 
of the countless people who "were known to 'oppose' 
slavery before Emancipation, or are said to 'oppose' 
capital punishment today," did not express that 
opposition in statements to government officials. In 
ordinary discourse an individual would be said to 
oppose capital punishment if he or she posted an 
objection to the death penalty on his or her Facebook 
page, or criticized it in a text message. The disclosure 
of a speaker's (or writer's) position is "opposition" 
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under Crawford so long as it is "an ostensibly disap- 
proving account." 555 U.S. at 276. In the instant case 
Debord's description of the harasser's hands as 
"creepy," and of his remarks and touching as "lewd," 
obviously manifested the disapproval deemed suffi- 
cient under Crawford. 
The Tenth Circuit thought Debord's statements 
fell outside the scope of section 704(a) because they 
were not "in accordance with Mercy's otherwise 
flexible reporting system for sexual harassment 
complaints." (App. 26a). But section 704(a) is not 
limited to "report[s]" that are "in accordance with [an 
employer's] reporting system," but extends far more 
broadly to "oppos[ition]" to sexual harassment or 
other unlawful practices. The section 704(a) protec- 
tion of workers who "opposed" discrimination is 
palpably and deliberately broader than the anti- 
retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
which forbids only retaliation against a worker for 
having "filed any complaint." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
Protection of complaint-filing at least ordinarily 
would require that the complaint be made to an 
employer or government official. See Kasten v. Saint- 
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325, 
1335 (2011) ("to fall within the scope of the anti- 
retaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently 
clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to un- 
derstand it, in light of both content and context, as an 
assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call 
for their protection"). Similarly, the alternative lan- 
guage of section 704(a), forbidding retaliation against 
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a worker because he or she "filed a charge," envisions 
a statement made to a particular entity, the EEOC or 
other appropriate anti-discrimination agency. Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) 
("if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be rea- 
sonably construed as a request for the agency to take 
remedial action to protect the employee's rights...."). 
But the Tenth Circuit assuredly erred in imposing a 
similar limitation on the differently-phrased prohibi- 
tion barring retaliation against a worker who "op- 
posed" discrimination. 
Like the limitation on section 704(a) rejected by 
this Court in Crawford, the Tenth Circuit rule has 
indefensibly peculiar consequences. The court of 
appeals suggested that Debord would have been 
protected if in her contacts with other workers she 
had been "trying to gather evidence." (App. 29a). On 
that view Debord could not have been fired if, for 
example, she had specifically asked other female em- 
ployees if they too had been harassed by Weaver; as 
the court of appeals noted, proof of widespread har- 
assment would have established a basis for holding 
Mercy liable for that harassment. (App. 3la-15a). But 
although, on the Tenth Circuit's view, Debord would 
have been protected if she asked other workers about 
harassment, under the court of appeals decision any 
worker she queried could be fired for answering 
Debord's questions (rather than using Mercy's report- 
ing system to complain about harassment). And if, in 
response to Debord's query, a worker inquired why 
Debord was asking, Debord herself could not answer 
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(e.g., could not tell the worker she was trying to shore 
up the claim then being investigated by Mercy), 
because doing so would have been disclosing infor- 
mation about an investigation. That is precisely the 
type of "freakish rule" that this Court in Crawford 
refused to read into section 704(a).23 
The rule in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits has a 
second implausible consequence. In order to establish 
a claim of unlawful sexual harassment, an employee 
must demonstrate that she subjectively perceived the 
harassment as creating a hostile work environment. 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 
(1993). Plaintiffs frequently make that showing, 
rebutting defense contentions that they did not mind 
the remarks or touching involved, by offering evi- 
dence that at the time of the harassment they com- 
plained about it to family or friends. In the Tenth and 
Fourth Circuits, however, a harassment victim would 
have to keep that harassment secret from friends or 
family, thus potentially undermining her legal claim 
under Title VII. And a woman who, mindful of the 
risk of legally permissible retaliation, had initially 
23
 The distinction is all the more indefensible because one 
worker's description of being sexually harassed could trigger a 
similar statement by a fellow employee. E.g., Homesley v. 
Freightliner Corp., 61 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Rita 
Chitwood ... , [a co-worker], came to Homesley's welding booth 
and saw her crying. Homesley told her of the sexual harassment 
by Yarborough. Chitwood said Yarborough had been doing the 
same thing to her and to Tona Collins"). 
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avoided telling her husband about being groped or 
sexually assaulted at work, might well hesitate to 
thereafter file a formal complaint or Title VII charge, 
understanding that the delay in disclosing that 
sexual contact to her spouse could raise serious 
problems in that relationship if her complaint or 
charge later brought that harassment to the attention 
of her spouse. "Nothing in the statute's text or [this 
Court's] precedents supports this catch-22." Craw- 
ford, 555 U.S. at 853. 
The Tenth Circuit dismissed Debord's text mes- 
sage - objecting to the harasser's remarks and ac- 
tions as "lewd" and describing the anticipated 
investigation — as "merely shar[ing] information with 
co-workers." (App. 29a). But sharing information is 
often a key method of opposing discrimination. For 
example, in McMahan v. UMG Mfg. & Logistics, Inc., 
2008 WL 906152 (S.D.Ind. March 31, 2008), a worker 
was fired for having warned a fellow employee that 
he was being singled out for television monitoring 
because of his disability. Applying the Second Circuit 
decision in Grant and the Sixth Circuit decision in 
Johnson, the district court in McMahan held this was 
protected activity.24 In DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 
u
 2008 WL 906152 at 4 ("UMG argues that McMahan's 
report to [a fellow employee] was not protected activity because 
he did not communicate his complaint to company manage- 
ment.... Contrary to defendant's argument that McMahan is not 
protected by law unless he complained to a manager, ... opposi- 
tion encompasses 'complaints about the employer to others that 
the employer learns about' ") (quoting 1 Barbara T. Lindemann 
(Continued on following page) 
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2013 WL 5274505 (W.D.Va. Sept. 17, 2013), 
"DeMasters told Doe that 'it appeared to [DeMasters] 
that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in viola- 
tion of Carilion's sexual harassment policy.' ... 
DeMasters reviewed the steps of Carilion's sexual 
harassment policy with Doe and suggested a plan to 
report the harassment." 2013 WL 5274505 at *1. 
Applying the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo, the 
district court in DeMasters held that this was not 
protected activity.25 A worker often would never 
realize that he or she was the victim of discrimination 
in compensation unless other employees disclosed 
what they were being paid. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 650 n.3 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[0]ne-third of private 
sector employers have adopted specific rules prohibiting 
employees from discussing their wages with co- 
workers."). Thompson v. North American Stainless, 
& Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1013 (4th 
ed. 2007)). 
26
 2013 WL 5274505 at *7 ("DeMasters' conversations with 
Doe are not oppositional. DeMasters alleges that he told Doe 
that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment and that Carillón 
had mishandled Doe's complaints.... These statements were not 
made to Carilion, but rather were.... provided to Doe.... State- 
ments made by DeMasters to Doe ... cannot qualify as opposi- 
tional conduct"; "DeMasters' statements to Doe ... are not 
protected oppositional activity. DeMasters did not make these 
statements to his employer, Carilion. There is no suggestion the 
DeMasters intended for Doe to pass his comments on to 
Carihon.... As in Pitrolo, this does not qualify as protected 
oppositional activity"). 
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LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011), held that the employer in 
that case could not retaliate against Thompson in 
reprisal for his fiancée's complaint about gender- 
based discrimination; but that unlawful retaliation 
would probably never have come to light if the fiancée 
had been forbidden to tell Thompson about her com- 
plaint. 
The rule in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits creates 
perverse incentives for employers. "To immunize an 
employer from a retaliation complaint because one of 
its supervisors has not heard directly from the em- 
ployee encourages the employer not to ask the em- 
ployee about complaints of co-workers ... or to 
immediately retaliate against the employee before he 
or she can voice protected opposition directly to 
superiors. In either case, the employer has thwarted 
the purposes of the anti-retaliation laws." Mondaine 
v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 626045 at *3 
(D.Kan. Jan. 26, 2006) (citing the Third Circuit 
decisions in Neiderlander and Hazen). Often the 
decision to file a formal internal complaint, or a Title 
VII charge, will grow out of discussions with co- 
workers or family members;26 the effective suppression 
26
 See Condiff v. Hart County School Dist., 770 F.Supp. 876, 
882 (W.D.Ky. 2011) ("when confronted with allegations of sexual 
harassment of her stepdaughter [by a teacher], Plaintiff in- 
structed her stepdaughter to document the incidents of sexual 
harassment on Plaintiff's personal e-mail account, informed her 
husband of the alleged harassment, forwarded the e-mail to her 
husband, discussed the incident with her husband, instructed 
(Continued on following page) 
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of those exchanges could throttle complaints and 
charges. For that reason, Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 
2012 WL 2521041 (D.Nev. June 27, 2012), refused to 
"condone an employer's 'gag order' on all discrimination- 
related workplace conversation. To do so ... could 
produce a chilling effect that deters employees with 
meritorious claims from bringing discrimination 
suits." 2012 WL 2521041 at *9. And in Chapin v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 2007 WL 915182 at *18 
(S.D.Ohio March 26, 2007), the court - citing the 
Second Circuit decision in Sumner and the Third 
Circuit decision in Neiderlander — held that the 
ADEA does protect discussions with co-workers about 
the possibility of filing a lawsuit under the ADEA. In 
Harris-Rogers v. Ferguson Enterprises, 2011 WL 
4460574 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011), after a co-worker 
complained to Harris-Rogers that she was being 
harassed by her supervisor, Harris-Rogers sent an 
email to the co-worker urging her to file a complaint. 
"Please consider contacting HQ, otherwise he will 
continue to harass[] you on everything.... [H]e 
need[ ] s to feel a little more from HR, can't be harass- 
ing associates...." at *1. But in that case the district 
court, bound by the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo, 
her husband to contact school officials regarding the harass- 
ment, and authorized him to forward the e-mail to school 
officials describing the sexual harassment...."). 
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held that the suggestion that the co-worker file a 
complaint was not protected activity.27 
Congress could not have intended to permit such 
preemptive retaliation, denying protection until a 
worker filed a complaint with his or her employer, a 
charge with the EEOC, or a lawsuit in federal or 
state court. The basic purpose of retaliation is to 
prevent aggrieved workers from opposing unlawful 
discrimination in the first place; making an example 
of a worker who already did so is only a means to that 
end. An employer intent upon preventing formal 
complaints or Title VII charges would be even more 
likely to utilize a type of retaliation that might si- 
lence a worker before he or she had even taken that 
step. Under Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742 (1998), an employer would be under an obligation 
to investigate second-hand reports of sexual harass- 
ment, as indeed occurred in Crawford. 555 U.S. at 
273. But under the decision below, as under the 
Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo, an employer could 
preemptively squelch those inconvenient rumors; 
indeed, the decision below is likely to have just that 
perverse effect. 
27
 2011 WL 4460574 at *7 ("[P]laintiff admits that she 
intended to send the ... email solely to [the co-worker] and only 
mistakenly sent it to a broader audience that included manage- 
ment personnel. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ... email 
was sent with the intention of voicing opposition about Fergu- 
son's employment policies, that is, to bring attention to any 
purported discriminatory activities by Ferguson. The ... email 
therefore does not qualify as opposition activity. Pitrolo...."). 
35 
It is equally inconceivable that Congress, having 
undeniably extended protection to workers who file 
internal complaints or EEOC charges, could have 
intended to permit employers to muzzle discussion of 
the manner in which those complaints or charges were 
being handled. The purpose of protecting complaints 
and charges is to correct the discrimination at issue; 
exchanging information and even voicing criticism of 
those processes can be vital to their effectiveness. In 
Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 2012 WL 2521041 
(D.Nev. June 27, 2012), "[plaintiff's supervisor] asked 
that Woodsford not discuss his pay cut or the [EEOC] 
charge with other [F]riendly employees. Woodsford 
protested this, saying that his compensation change 
and EEOC charge were 'absolutely everybody's busi- 
ness.'" 2012 WL 2521041 at *2. "The listed reasons 
for suspending Woodsford [included] that ... he vio- 
lated [his supervisor's] instruction not to discuss his 
compensation reduction and the EEOC charge with 
his co-workers...." The district court, citing the Second 
Circuit decision in Grant and the Sixth Circuit deci- 
sion in Johnson, held that Woodsford's discussion of 
his discrimination claim and charge were protected 
activity. "Defendant argues that Woodsford was not en- 
gaging in a protected activity under the opposition clause 
when he spoke to non-management Friendly employees 
while on the job in violation of Defendant's instructions 
not to do so.... Friendly's instruction to Woodsford con- 
tradicts the plain language of [the anti-retaliation pro- 
vision of the ADEA] ... 'Opposing1 an unlawful action 
encompasses speaking to fellow employees about a 
charge filed in opposition to the alleged discrimination." 
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Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 2012 WL 2521041 at *9 
(emphasis in original). On the other hand, the court 
in DeMasters, applying the contrary Fourth Circuit 
rule in Pitrolo, held that the plaintiff was not protected 
by section 704(a) when he told a harassment victim 
that the employer "was mishandling [her] complaints." 
DeMasters v. Carillon Clinic, 2013 WL 5274505 at *2. 
The majority rule, interpreting section 704(a) 
(and other similarly-phrased anti-retaliation provi- 
sions) to apply to statements of opposition made to 
anyone, not merely to employers, has been the con- 
sistent interpretation of the EEOC. The EEOC char- 
acterizes as "[e]xamples of [opposition" protected by 
section 704(a) and other statutes "[c]omplaining to 
anyone about discrimination." EEOC Compliance 
Manual section 8-II(B)(2). 
A complaint or protest about alleged em- 
ployment discrimination to a manager, union 
official, co-worker, company EEO official, at- 
torney, newspaper reporter, Congressperson, 
or anyone else constitutes opposition.... Ex- 
ample 2 — C[harging]P[arty] complains to co- 
workers about harassment of a disabled 
employee by a supervisor. This complaint 
constitutes "opposition." 
Id.-, see id. at section 8-II(B)(3)(a) ("Courts have 
protected an employee's right to inform an employer's 
customers about the employer's alleged discrimina- 
tion, as well as the right to engage in peaceful picket- 
ing to oppose allegedly discriminatory employment 
practices"). "EEOC compliance manuals 'reflect "a 
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body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guid- 
ance.'"" Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 (quoting Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) 
and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)). 
III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT 
VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE QUES- 
TION PRESENTED 
This case presents an excellent vehicle for resolv- 
ing the question presented. Because two assertedly 
protected statements were in writing — one in a 
Facebook post, and one in a text message — the exact 
nature of those statements is clear, presenting a 
highly concrete dispute. The precise date on which 
Mercy learned of the statements is known, and there 
is substantial contemporaneous evidence that Mercy 
officials objected to all the statements. 
The case presents two types of statements to co- 
workers. First, both the Facebook Post (about 
"creepy" hands) and the text message (about "lewd" 
remarks and actions) constitute the type of disap- 
proving comment that would be sufficient under 
Crawford. Second, the text message, in its reference 
to the Mercy investigation and to Debord's expecta- 
tion that a Mercy official would be questioning the 
other women in the department, poses the question of 
whether the protections for such statements about 
the existence or handling of a discrimination com- 
plaint or charge are different than the protections 
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accorded to objections to particular discriminatory 
acts as such. 
The court below noted that Mercy had advanced 
"a number of reasons - unrelated to Debord's com- 
plaint of sexual harassment," to defend its decision to 
dismiss her. (App. 28a). But Title VII does not require 
a plaintiff to show that retaliation (or discrimination) 
was the sole reason for a disputed termination or 
other adverse action. Even where an employer also 
had one or more other, lawful reasons for the action 
complained of, the plaintiff will still prevail if she 
demonstrates that an unlawful purpose (or two or 
more such purposes in combination) was the but-for 
cause of that action. University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013). If 
this Court holds that the Facebook post, text mes- 
sage, or discussion related to sexual harassment were 
indeed protected activity, Mercy will be free to argue 
on remand that any reasonable jury would have to 
find that Mercy would have dismissed Debord on 
other, lawful grounds, even in the absence of such 
protected activity. But because the Tenth Circuit be- 
lieved that that Facebook post, the text message, and 
discussion were all unprotected by section 704(a), it 
had no occasion to reach that issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
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Opinion 
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge. 
Sara Debord filed suit against her employer, 
Mercy Health Services of Kansas, for sexual harass- 
ment and retaliation in violation of Title VIL Debord 
claims Mercy knew or should have known that her 
supervisor created a hostile workplace through un- 
wanted touching and offensive sexual remarks. She 
also claims that Mercy did not do enough to prevent 
2a 
sexual harassment in the workplace, and that, when 
she finally reported the harassment, Mercy retaliated 
by firing her. 
After reviewing the evidence at summary judg- 
ment, the district court concluded there was no 
triable issue of material fact. We agree. The record 
does not disclose that Mercy knew or should have 
known about Debord's allegations of a hostile work- 
place, and she has not provided a reasonable explan- 
ation for the nearly five years she waited to first 
report the harassment. Nor is there a genuine dispute 
about whether Mercy honestly held legitimate rea- 
sons for terminating Debord based on its conclusion 
that she was dishonest and disruptive during Mercy's 
investigation of allegations about her supervisor's 
conduct and claims she improperly received extra pay. 
Debord resists these conclusions with myriad ar- 
guments, but none is sufficiently developed or sup- 
ported by the record to merit a trial. 
Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, we AFFIRM.1 
I. Background 
Debord worked as a nuclear-medicine technician 
at Mercy Hospital in Independence, Kansas. Debord's 
1
 Mercy also raises a cross-appeal for costs. On this issue, 
we reverse the district court, as explained below. 
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direct supervisor was Leonard Weaver, the hospital's 
director of radiology. 
A. Debord's Allegations of Sexual Harass- 
ment 
Soon after Debord was hired in 2004, she con- 
tends her supervisor Weaver began regularly placing 
his hands up her sleeve or down the back of her 
shirt.2 According to Debord, this occurred "at least 
three days a week." Aplt.App. 169. Weaver claims he 
was just trying to show her how unusually cold his 
hands were, but Debord says the touching was sexual 
harassment. In any event, Debord did not tell Mercy's 
management that Weaver was touching her until 
July 2009. 
Debord also says Weaver frequently made offen- 
sive sexual comments and advances, such as pulling 
down the neck of her shirt while she was leaning over 
a patient, asking her to show him her chest, and 
using sexually suggestive language when she wore 
certain clothing. Id. at 174-76. Although Debord told 
Weaver to stop this behavior, she did not report the 
misconduct to management. 
2
 In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judg- 
ment, we recite the facts presented in the light most favorable to 
Debord, the nonmoving party. See Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 710 
F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir.2013). It is true that Debord separately 
moved for summary judgment, but that was against Weaver's 
counterclaim for defamation, a claim that is not before us in this 
appeal. 
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B. Debord's Facebook Posts and Mercy's Re- 
sponse 
Mercy's management first received notice of this 
behavior on July 6, 2009, through a publicly available 
message on Facebook, a website for social network- 
ing. Earlier that day, Weaver had criticized Debord 
and then attempted to hug her. Angered by Weaver's 
comments, Debord logged onto Facebook and wrote 
several posts during work hours. The relevant posts 
said, 
(At 9:00 am) Sara DeBord loves it when my 
boss adds an extra $600.00 on my paycheck 
for hours I didn't even work . . . awesome!! 
(At 1:37 pm) Sara DeBord is sooo disappointed 
.. . can't believe what a snake my boss is . . . 
I know, I know everyone warned me:( 
(At 2:53 pm) Oh, it's hard to explain. . . . ba- 
sically, the MRI tech is getting paid for doing 
MRI even though he's not registered and my- 
self, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our 
areas . . . and he tells me 'good luck taking it 
to HR because you're not supposed to know 
that' plus he adds money on peoples checks if 
he likes them (I've been one of them) . . . and 
he needs to keep his creapy hands to himself 
. . . just an all around d-bag!! 
Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added). 
Many of Debord's co-workers saw these posts, 
including Weaver. Later that day, Debord met with 
Mercy's HR Director, Eric Ammons, to discuss a 
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gender-based pay-disparity claim that Debord had 
recently raised. Weaver interrupted the meeting to 
confront Debord about the posts. Ammons asked if 
Debord authored them, but she denied it. Then 
Weaver brought his laptop to show Ammons exactly 
what the posts said. Even though they appeared on 
Debord's Facebook page, Debord again denied writing 
them. She explained that anyone could access her 
Facebook page from her cellular phone, and because 
she left her phone unattended at times, someone else 
could have created the posts. 
After Weaver left the meeting, Ammons asked 
Debord about the post that mentioned extra money 
on her paycheck, and Debord claimed that Weaver 
had in fact added money to her paycheck around 
Thanksgiving of 2006 or 2007, and that when she 
brought it to his attention, he did not correct the 
overpay. Ammons began investigating this overpay 
allegation. 
Two days later, on July 8, Ammons again met 
with Debord about the Facebook posts. For a third 
time, she denied making the posts, so Ammons ex- 
plained that Mercy would have to spend a lot of 
money to find the real culprit unless she confessed. 
Debord finally owned up to her conduct, and Ammons 
informed her she would be suspended for one day 
without pay for "[f]ail[ing] to conduct yourself in a 
manner consistent with a high degree of personal 
integrity and professionalism." Id. at 288. 
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Before ending the meeting, Ammons asked about 
the "creepy hands" comment at the end of Debord's 
posts. Ammons said this comment concerned him 
most. Debord then told Ammons that Weaver touched 
her and a lot of the women in the department with 
his cold hands. Ammons asked if she thought it was 
sexual harassment, and she replied that she did not 
think so - she just thought that Weaver was a "per- 
vert." Id. at 233-34. Ammons said that Weaver's 
behavior was "inappropriate" and "should never hap- 
pen," and that he would have Mercy's risk manager, 
Lana Brewster, investigate the matter to see if there 
was "any potential for sexual harassment." Id. at 
166, 234-35. Meanwhile, he continued investigating 
Debord's claim that Weaver added money to her 
paycheck. 
C. Mercy's Investigation 
The next day, July 9, Debord met with Brewster. 
Brewster said she was there to talk about Debord's 
sexual harassment complaint, but Debord denied hav- 
ing made a sexual harassment complaint; she said 
she had only answered Ammons's questions. Brewster 
asked Debord what she meant by the "creepy hands" 
post on Facebook. Debord described Weaver's "daily 
touching" of her arm or neck with his cold hands, in 
addition to two sexual remarks Weaver had made to 
her. Id. at 188-89. Brewster asked Debord if she 
wanted to file a formal complaint, but Debord de- 
clined. Brewster then told Debord to let her know 
if there were any more problems. Debord assured 
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Brewster that the touching and comments "probably 
wouldn't happen again." Id. at 188. 
That same day, Brewster also interviewed a long- 
time, female employee in Weaver's department. This 
employee denied the existence of any hostility or 
sexual tension in the department. 
Also on that day, Brewster interviewed Weaver. 
He did not confirm making any sexual remarks to 
Debord but admitted to occasionally touching her and 
other employees on the arm to show them how cold 
his hands were. Brewster told him "if anything was 
going on to cease." Id. at 570. Based on these inter- 
views, she concluded that Weaver had not violated 
company policy. 
D. Debord's Termination 
By July 13, Ammons determined that Debord's 
overpay claim was false. He also learned that Debord 
was sending messages to other employees in which 
she accused Weaver of destroying the overpay evi- 
dence. This troubled Ammons because he already told 
Debord that the overpay evidence was in his, not 
Weaver's, possession. Further, he learned that Debord's 
comments about the overpay and the related investi- 
gation had disrupted the workday for many hospital 
employees. Ammons thus decided, after conferring 
with Mercy's CEO and COO, to terminate Debord. 
Later that day, he told Debord she was terminated for 
disruption, inappropriate behavior, and dishonesty. 
8a 
E. Procedural History 
Debord filed suit against Mercy for sex discrimi- 
nation and retaliation in violation of Title VII,3 and 
she filed suit against Weaver for assault and battery. 
Weaver counterclaimed for defamation. Following dis- 
covery, all parties moved for summary judgment. The 
district court granted summary judgment against all 
claims and required each party to bear its own costs. 
See Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 860 
F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Kan.2012) (summary judgment); 
Aplt.App. 764 (costs). Mercy made a special motion 
for costs as a prevailing party, which the court denied. 
Debord appealed the judgment on her sex discrimi- 
nation and retaliation claims against Mercy; Mercy 
cross-appealed its denial of costs.4 
We turn first to Debord's sexual harassment and 
retaliation claims. We conclude with a brief discus- 
sion of Mercy's cross-appeal for costs. 
3
 Debord also filed a complaint with the Kansas Human 
Rights Commission (KHRC), but the KHRC did not have juris- 
diction over the case because Mercy is a "sectarian employer" 
under Kansas employment law. See Aplt.App. 261, 294. See gen- 
erally Van Scoyk v. St. Mary's Assumption Parochial Sch., 224 
Kan. 304, 580 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1978). 
4
 Weaver's counterclaim and Debord's claims against 
Weaver are not before this court. 
9a 
II. Analysis 
It is unlawful for an employer to permit sexual 
harassment in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 
2(a)(1); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 
(1986). It is also unlawful for an employer to retaliate 
against an employee for opposing sexual harassment 
in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
Here, Debord claims Mercy violated both provi- 
sions. She claims Mercy permitted sexual harassment 
in the workplace, and she claims Mercy terminated 
her for reporting it. The district court determined 
that Debord did not have enough evidence to merit a 
trial on either claim, so the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mercy on both. We review the 
district court's decision de novo. Daniels v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 627 (10th Cir.2012). 
A. Sexual Harassment/Hostile Workplace 
An employee who is sexually harassed by a su- 
pervisor may have a claim against the employer un- 
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Meritor, All 
U.S. at 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(l). Under Title VII, harassment is ac- 
tionable only when it is "sufficiently severe or perva- 
sive" such that a reasonable person would find the 
work environment to be hostile or abusive and the 
employee in fact perceived it to be so. Meritor, All 
U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399; Faragher v. City of Boca 
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Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 
662 (1998). 
An employer may be directly or vicariously liable 
for a hostile workplace. To show direct employer 
liability, an employee must present enough evidence 
for a reasonable jury to find that the employer knew 
or should have known about the harassment but 
failed to stop it. Burlington Indus, v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 758-59, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). 
The "should-have-known" formulation is, in effect, a 
showing that the employer was negligent in failing to 
stop harassment. 
Even without a showing of negligence, an em- 
ployer can still be found vicariously liable for harass- 
ment committed by a supervisor against an employee. 
To avoid vicarious liability, an employer can take 
advantage of an affirmative defense - the Faragher 
defense - by showing both that the employer "ex- 
ercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to 
eliminate it when it might occur," and that the com- 
plaining employee "failed to act with like reasonable 
care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards." 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805, 118 S.Ct. 2275. 
Debord raises both theories — direct and vicarious 
liability. We review each in turn. 
1. Direct Employer Liability 
"An employer is directly liable for a hostile 
work environment created by any employee if the 
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employer's negligence causes the actionable work en- 
vironment." Baty v. Willamette Indus., 172 F.3d 1232, 
1241 (10th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by 
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 
122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). "'An em- 
ployer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment 
if it knew or should have known about the conduct 
and failed to stop it.'" Id. at 1241-42 (quoting Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257). 
a. Actual Knowledge 
Debord admits that Weaver never made his sex- 
ual comments or advances in front of Mercy's man- 
agement, and she admits she never told management 
about the harassment. Instead, to prove actual knowl- 
edge, she relies on a former employee's complaint to 
management about Weaver's touching. The complaint 
was made in 2001, but Debord argues that the com- 
plaint shows Mercy actually knew of the sexual ha- 
rassment Debord experienced from 2004 to 2009. 
Evidence of the former employee's complaint 
comes from an internal email summarizing the re- 
sults of the employee's exit interview. On the subject 
of Weaver's touching, the email states, "[Weaver] 
learned that the cold hands on [sic] is not appreci- 
ated." Aplt.App. 650. Nothing more is said on the 
subject. 
"In determining whether to consider acts alleged 
by other employees, we look to '[t]he extent and seri- 
ousness of the earlier harassment and the similarity 
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and nearness in time to the later harassment. . . 
Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th 
Cir.2008) (quoting Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 
61 F.3d 777, 783-84 (10th Cir.1995)), abrogated on 
other grounds by Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 
2257, and Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275. 
On nearness in time, this prior event cannot 
support actual notice. Occurring three years prior to 
Debord's arrival, this notice of one instance of poten- 
tial harassment of someone else cannot, without 
more, constitute actual notice of Debord's sexual ha- 
rassment three years later. As to our requirement 
that evidence be produced showing the extent, seri- 
ousness, and similarity of the misconduct, not much 
can be said to support actual notice either. The record 
discloses one employee complained in 2001, but we do 
not know where or how often Weaver touched the 
employee, nor whether the touching was considered 
sexual harassment. And there is no evidence Weaver 
made any sexual comments or advances with the 
2001 employee, as he purportedly did with Debord. 
Ammons's reaction to Debord's complaint also 
suggests that Mercy did not know about any sexual 
harassment. According to Debord's own testimony, 
Ammons was surprised when she told him about 
Weaver sexually harassing her, and Ammons had 
been working at Mercy since at least the late 1990s.5 
5
 It is true that, by the time of his deposition, Ammons 
knew that Weaver "puts his cold hands on - on other women, 
(Continued on following page) 
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In sum, Debord does not raise a genuine dispute 
about whether Mercy actually knew of her harass- 
ment prior to July 2009. 
b. Constructive Knowledge 
Debord also fails to present sufficient evidence 
showing Mercy should have known about the sexual 
harassment before July 2009. 
"When a management-level employee has not 
been notified," as here, we apply "what amounts to a 
negligence standard: highly pervasive harassment 
should, in the exercise of reasonable care, be discov- 
ered by management-level employees." Tademy, 614 
F.3d at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Obviously, then, to find constructive notice, we first 
must find harassment. Harassment has both objec- 
tive and subjective components. Morris v. City of 
Colorado Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 663 (10th Cir.2012). 
For the objective component, we look to the "totality 
of the circumstances" and "consider[] such factors 
as the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or hu- 
miliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 
performance." Id. at 664 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). For the subjective component, we look to see 
other people." ApltApp. 547. But significantly absent from the 
record is any indication that Ammons knew of this conduct prior 
to Debord's Facebook post on July 6, 2009. 
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if the victim perceived the environment to be abusive. 
Id. at 665. 
After an employee establishes the existence of 
harassment, we look to see whether the incidents of 
harassment were "so egregious, numerous, and con- 
centrated as to add up to a campaign of harassment 
that the employer will be culpable for failure to dis- 
cover what is going on." Adler u. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 675 (10th Cir.1998) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted); cf. Harsco 
Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir.2007). 
Only then do we find constructive notice. Adler, 144 
F.3d at 675. 
Debord claims Weaver touched at least six other 
female co-workers. But she provides the statements 
of only three co-workers, and these statements do not 
demonstrate that incidents of sexual harassment 
were "so egregious, numerous, and concentrated" as 
to create a jury question on constructive notice. Id. 
The three co-workers testified that Weaver showed 
them his cold hands by touching their forearms or 
necks. But they did not testify that the touching was 
sexual harassment; in fact, one explicitly dismissed 
Weaver's touching as not "sexual." See Aplt.App. 633. 
Although this co-worker considered Weaver's behav- 
ior inappropriate after learning about Debord's law- 
suit, she testified that, before the suit, "[i]t didn't 
seem like [Weaver] was crossing the line." Id. at 635. 
And while another testified that the touches were 
unwelcome, id. at 642, and a third testified that the 
touches made her feel uncomfortable, id. at 612, not 
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one of Debord's co-workers said that Weaver had sex- 
ually harassed her, nor did any say that she reported 
his behavior. 
Debord also offered evidence from an employee 
who worked under Weaver between 1994 and 1998 — 
years before Debord's employment. This former em- 
ployee testified that Weaver regularly put his cold 
hands on her neck, but she also did not report these 
episodes to management at the time. 
A comparison between this case and Hirase-Doi 
is instructive. In that case, we found a genuine fac- 
tual dispute on constructive notice because the plain- 
tiff introduced evidence showing that "as many as 
eight to ten [female] employees" were being sexually 
harassed during one male employee's three-month 
tenure. 61 F.3d at 784. The male employee made 
"persistent requests for sex and inquiries of [female 
employees'] sexual conduct," as well as "open-ended 
invitations to all female employees to satisfy his 
sexual desires" and "threatening and intimidating 
stares." Id. at 780. Worse, he "passed a sexually ex- 
plicit note," "attempted to kiss [another] on the neck 
and brushed her breast with his hand," and "grabbed 
[yet another female employee] between her legs." Id. 
at 781. By contrast, the allegations in this case do not 
constitute a similar "campaign of harassment" bla- 
tantly obvious to management. Adler, 144 F.3d at 675. 
In sum, the sexual harassment borne out by 
Debord's evidence does not rise to the level of "egre- 
giousness" and "pervasiveness" that creates a genuine 
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dispute on constructive notice. Tademy, 614 F.3d at 
1147. 
We now turn to whether Mercy may nevertheless 
be vicariously liable for Weaver's behavior. 
2. Vicarious Liability 
"An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
victimized employee for an actionable hostile envi- 
ronment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee." 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275. But when 
no tangible employment action is taken, as here, an 
employer may defeat liability by showing it took rea- 
sonable steps to avoid a hostile workplace by adopting 
policies available to employees to report harassment 
— the Faragher defense. See id. 
The Faragher defense "comprises two necessary 
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em- 
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Helm v. Kan- 
sas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir.2011) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). These two ele- 
ments are designed to "encourag[e] forethought by 
employers and saving action by objecting employees." 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275. 
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a. First Element - Prevention and 
Correction 
The first element of the Faragher defense "ac- 
tually imposes two distinct requirements on an em- 
ployer": "(1) the employer must have exercised 
reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and 
(2) the employer must have exercised reasonable care 
to correct promptly any sexual harassment that 
occurred." Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288 (citing Pinkerton v. 
Colo. Dep't of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1062 (10th 
Cir.2009)). 
Prevention. "[An] employer[] act[s] reasonably 
as a matter of law [to prevent harassment if it] 
adopted valid sexual harassment policies [and] dis- 
tributed those policies to employees via employee 
handbooks, [even if it] either provided no sexual ha- 
rassment training or provided training only to man- 
agers." Id. at 1289. In Helm, the employer's policy 
"prohibit[ed] sexual harassment, contain[ed] a com- 
plaint procedure and [a] list of personnel to whom 
harassment may be reported, and include[d] an anti- 
retaliation provision." Id. at 1288. The employer then 
"distribut[ed] that policy to all employees via an em- 
ployee handbook, requir[ed] employees to acknowl- 
edge in writing their understanding of the policies 
contained in the handbook, and provid[ed] training to 
managers regarding the sexual harassment policy." 
Id. at 1289. We concluded that the Helm employer's 
sexual harassment policy was "a reasonable mecha- 
nism for prevention." Id. at 1290 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Debord does not challenge the content or distri- 
bution of Mercy's sexual harassment policy. Rather, 
she says the fact that Weaver sexually harassed her 
shows the inadequacy of Mercy's efforts to prevent 
sexual harassment. But a plaintiff must do more than 
merely allege harassment to defeat this element of 
the Faragher defense. Otherwise, the Faragher de- 
fense would not work. 
Given this obstacle, Debord also argues that 
Mercy's policy is "per se ineffective" because one man- 
ager, Brewster, testified that the policy prohibits only 
"intimate touching." Aplt. Br. at 36; Reply Br. at 7. 
But Brewster's testimony was not that Mercy's policy 
prohibited only intimate touching. Rather, in discuss- 
ing Mercy's sexual harassment policy, Brewster ver- 
ified that the policy prohibited a range of conduct, 
including "discuss[ing] sexual activities, tell[ing] off- 
color jokes, and touch[ing] unnecessarily." Aplt.App. 
566. Brewster then testified that "[i]f it were intimate 
touching," she would consider the conduct a violation 
of the policy. Id. And, in fact, Mercy treated Debord's 
allegation of unwanted touching as an allegation of 
sexual harassment. 
Mercy has shown that it "adopted valid sexual 
harassment policies [and] distributed those policies to 
employees via employee handbooks." Helm, 656 F.3d 
at 1289. The prevention component of the Faragher 
defense does not require more. 
Correction. The second requirement is whether 
an employer can "show that it acted reasonably 
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promptly on [an employee's] complaint when it was 
given proper notice of her allegations as required 
under its complaint procedures." Id. at 1290 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Obviously, the "most sig- 
nificant immediate measure an employer can take in 
response to a sexual harassment complaint is to 
launch a prompt investigation to determine whether 
the complaint is justified." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
No genuine dispute exists here that Mercy's cor- 
rective measures were sufficient. As outlined above, 
Mercy acted "reasonably promptly" after learning of 
Debord's allegations on July 8 by launching an imme- 
diate investigation. As soon as he learned of Debord's 
allegations, Ammons referred the matter to Brewster, 
and Brewster promptly investigated the allegations. 
Debord claims that is not enough. She claims 
Brewster acted unreasonably because (1) Weaver was 
not disciplined, (2) Brewster did not believe that 
Debord made a sexual harassment complaint in the 
first place, and (3) Brewster misled Debord into 
thinking there was an actual complaint form when no 
such form existed. Thus, says Debord, Mercy's efforts 
were insufficient to correct sexual harassment. 
Debord's arguments do not raise a genuine dis- 
pute of material fact. First, corrective action does not 
always require discipline. Cf. Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 
1062-63 (finding "no genuine issue left" on whether 
the employer promptly corrected a harassment claim 
where "[t]he alleged harassment . . . ceased — without 
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resuming — after [the] complaint," the plaintiff did 
not then request any immediate corrective action, the 
employer launched a prompt investigation anyway, 
and the matter was resolved "in a matter of weeks"). 
Second, Brewster investigated Debord's complaint, 
even though Debord denied making a sexual harass- 
ment complaint at the time. And third, Debord did 
not need a written form; she had Mercy's HR Director 
(Ammons) and risk manager (Brewster) asking her to 
file a complaint, and she declined their offers. No 
genuine issue of material fact remains as to the ade- 
quacy of Mercy's corrective measures. 
b. Second Element - Unreasonable 
Delay 
An employer may satisfy the second element of 
the Faragher defense "by showing that the victimized 
employee unreasonably delayed in reporting incidents 
of sexual harassment." Helm, 656 F.3d at 1291. 
The district court correctly concluded that Mercy 
meets the second element. In Pinkerton, we found "a 
reporting delay of approximately two or two and a 
half months" unreasonable where the plaintiff's only 
explanation was a "generalized fear of retaliation," 
and the plaintiff "had received the harassment train- 
ing and knew that the incidents should have been 
reported." 563 F.3d at 1063-64. Here, the reporting 
delay spanned five years — Debord did not report the 
harassment from 2004 until 2009 — and that amount 
of delay is unreasonable. 
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Debord's explanation for her delay is (1) she did 
not know it was harassment at the time, and (2) she 
thought the complaint would have been futile because 
Weaver's wife was one of the hospital's two surgeons. 
Debord's first explanation suggests either that 
Weaver's behavior was not harassment at all (because 
Debord did not subjectively experience it as harass- 
ment) or that Debord unreasonably failed to consult 
the sexual harassment materials provided to her by 
Mercy. Either way, this explanation does not justify 
her failure to report Weaver's behavior to manage- 
ment. 
Her second explanation is also inadequate. A fail- 
ure to report harassment cannot be excused merely 
because the accuser believes the report will be futile; 
the accuser's belief must be reasonable. But saying 
that the accused's spouse is also employed by the 
hospital - without more - does not establish objective 
futility. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 
240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir.2001) ("We cannot accept 
the argument that reporting sexual harassment is 
rendered futile merely because members of the man- 
agement team happen to be friends."). Besides, 
Debord does not dispute that Mercy offered an anon- 
ymous reporting system, and Debord has not offered 
a reasonable explanation for failing to use even that. 
Nor does she show any evidence that action would not 
be taken; to the contrary, her reports to HR prompted 
an immediate response. 
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In sum, Mercy cannot be held vicariously li- 
able. Debord stayed silent even after Mercy provided 
sexual harassment training, annual reminders, an 
open-door policy with the management team, and an 
anonymous hotline to report harassment. Her sexual 
harassment claim fails to raise a disputed, material 
fact. 
We now turn to Debord's retaliation claim. 
B. Retaliation 
Debord also claims Mercy fired her as retaliation 
for her complaint about sexual harassment in the 
workplace. Where, as here, the plaintiff does not have 
direct evidence of retaliation, we follow the three-step 
framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 
First, Debord must present a prima facie case for 
retaliation. Next, Mercy must respond with "legiti- 
mate, nonretaliatory reason[s]" for Debord's termina- 
tion. Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 
998 (10th Cir.2011). Then Debord must show that 
Mercy's stated reasons were pretextual. Daniels, 701 
F.3d at 639. 
Like the district court below, we assume without 
deciding that Debord made a prima facie case for 
retaliation. And Debord does not dispute that Mercy 
proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for termi- 
nating her. Rather, Debord claims that Mercy's prof- 
fered reasons are mere pretext for Mercy's actual 
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intention to punish her for reporting sexual harass- 
ment. 
"To show pretext, [Debord] must produce evi- 
dence showing weakness, implausibility, inconsis- 
tency, incoherency, or contradiction in [the employer's] 
stated reasons, such that a reasonable jury could find 
them unconvincing." Id. "Tn determining whether the 
proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we ex- 
amine the facts as they appear to the person making 
the decision,' " not as they appear to the plaintiff. 
Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir.2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in orig- 
inal). And we do not ask "whether the employer's 
proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct"; we ask 
only "whether [the employer] honestly believed those 
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs." 
Id. at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Ammons's stated reasons for terminating Debord 
were her inappropriate, disruptive behavior and her 
dishonesty. Debord does not dispute these charges. 
She admits posting inflammatory material about her 
supervisor on the internet, sending text messages to 
co-workers bad-mouthing her supervisor (unrelated 
to the alleged sexual harassment), discussing the 
overpay and harassment investigations with others, 
knowingly pocketing overpayment in 2007, and thrice 
lying about posting information on Facebook while at 
work. No reasonable jury could find these reasons 
"unconvincing." Daniels, 701 F.3d at 639. Thus, no 
reasonable jury could find pretext. 
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Debord's many arguments to the contrary do not 
raise a genuine dispute of material fact. She argues 
that (1) Ammons willfully ignored evidence of her 
2007 overpay, (2) Ammons could not lawfully termi- 
nate her for using Facebook to air her complaints, 
(3) Ammons's stated reasons for her termination are 
vague and subjective, (4) Ammons could not lawfully 
terminate her for making a false sexual harassment 
claim, (5) Ammons could not lawfully terminate her 
for communicating with others about the pending 
investigations, and (6) Mercy's management failed to 
investigate her sex-based pay-disparity claim. 
First, Debord claims Ammons willfully ignored evi- 
dence showing that she had been overpaid. Ammons 
testified - and Debord does not dispute — that he 
reviewed call-back logs and pay stubs from 2006, and 
they do not show overpay. Therefore, as of July 13, 
2009 (the date of Debord's termination), he reason- 
ably believed that Debord's overpay claim was false. 
This belief was one reason that Ammons cited for why 
he considered Debord to have been dishonest. 
Months later, however, Mercy's management 
discovered that, according to the logs and pay stubs 
for 2007, Debord had in fact been overpaid. Debord 
argues that Ammons's failure to review the 2007 
documents demonstrates pretext. 
But Debord does not dispute that she mentioned 
only 2006 at her second meeting with Ammons, the 
July 8 meeting - two days after she first told him 
"2006 or 2007." Aplt.App. 463. At most, this evidence 
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suggests Ammons's failure to review documents from 
2007 resulted from negligence, forgetfulness, or con- 
fusion - not intentional ignorance to hide a retalia- 
tory motive against Debord for her sexual harassment 
complaint. 
Second, citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perfor- 
mance Plastics Corp.,   U.S.  , 131 S.Ct. 1325, 
179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011), Debord argues that terminat- 
ing her for her post on Facebook was per se unlawful 
because that was her way of reporting sexual har- 
assment.6 And she says Mercy made up this reason 
post hoc anyway because her termination slip does 
not specifically reference those posts. 
In Kasten, the Supreme Court held that the anti- 
retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), protects oral as well as written 
complaints. The Court therefore reversed summary 
judgment for the employer where the employee orally 
called attention to unlawful practices, and where, 
significantly here, the employee did so "in accordance 
6
 In a footnote, she also cites Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 
No. 1:10-CV1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601022 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 29, 
2011) (magistrate judge's recommendation), and Mattingly v. 
Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.DArk. 
Nov. 1, 2011), saying these decisions show that "similar com- 
plaints on Facebook . . . deserve protection." Aplt. Br. at 49 n. 3. 
But these unpublished opinions address First Amendment pro- 
tection for Facebook posts related to matters of a public concern. 
These decisions are therefore irrelevant to this case, as Debord 
neither has raised a First Amendment claim nor has argued that 
her posts are related to a matter of public concern. 
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with [the employer's] internal grievance-resolution 
procedure." Id. at 1329. The Court later observed that 
"it is difficult to see how an employer who does not (or 
should not) know an employee has made a complaint 
could discriminate because of that complaint." Id. at 
1335 (emphasis in original). 
Under the logic of Kasten, Debord's sexual har- 
assment complaint - i.e., her Facebook post - falls 
short. Her Facebook post was not in accordance with 
Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting system for sexual 
harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did 
not provide any notice to Mercy. Only when Weaver 
himself brought the post to Ammons's attention did 
Mercy learn that, among many other complaints, 
Debord disliked Weaver's "creepy hands." And even 
then, Debord thrice denied authoring the post. No 
jury could conclude that Mercy's management acted 
unreasonably in response to Debord's Facebook post. 
Cf. Helm, 656 F.3d at 1291 (concluding it was "en- 
tirely reasonable" not to investigate allegations of 
sexual harassment when the plaintiff told her em- 
ployer she "did not wish to pursue her complaint"). 
Besides, Ammons's decision to terminate Debord 
did not turn on whether she aired her grievances 
on Facebook; instead, the decision turned on her dis- 
honesty about authoring the posts while at work and 
her disruptive behavior during the investigation. 
Debord cannot dispute that dishonesty is a valid 
ground for terminating an employee. Nor can she 
genmnely dispute that she behaved inappropriately 
and disruptively by, for example, sending messages 
27a 
to co-workers about confidential investigations in con- 
travention of Mercy's policies.7 
Third, Debord says that Ammons's stated rea- 
sons for terminating her are vague and subjective and 
therefore point to pretext. But the "dishonesty" here 
is not subjective at all, as Debord already conceded 
she lied. And "inappropriate and disruptive behavior" 
is not vague, given the context. 
Nor do the cases Debord cites demand a different 
result. In Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 
1108 (10th Cir.2007), for example, the employee's evi- 
dence of pretext was that the investigation into her 
misconduct focused on whether or not she had been 
rude to a customer. This, the employee argued, was 
subjective and hence pretextual. We disagreed. We 
noted that "the existence of subjective criteria alone 
is not considered evidence of pretext." Id. at 1120. We 
then affirmed summary judgment for the employer 
because the employee did not present evidence that 
7
 Debord contends that Ammons was inconsistent about 
when he told her to keep the matter confidential and that a call 
log shows he is not telling the truth. But Ammons consistently 
testified that he called Debord before she sent text messages; it 
is Debord who said he did not call until after she sent the mes- 
sages. And we cannot deduce from the numbers in the call-log 
exhibit who called whom. In any event, the record shows that 
Ammons told Debord to keep the investigation confidential, and 
later he learned that Debord sent co-workers text messages 
about the investigation anyway. Because we decide pretext based 
on what Ammons knew at the time, we cannot say these argu- 
ments raise a jury question. 
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similarly situated employees were treated differently, 
nor did she present evidence that others in manage- 
ment "deliberately withheld information" or other- 
wise misled the decisionmaker. Id. Likewise, Debord 
has not shown that similarly situated employees were 
treated differently or that Brewster withheld infor- 
mation from or otherwise misled Ammons. 
In the other case Debord cites, Hurlbert v. St. 
Mary's Health Care Sys., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.2006), 
the plaintiff's termination slip omitted the reasons 
for his termination, and the plaintiff's termination 
process conflicted with the employer's usual practice. 
See id. at 1298-99. By contrast, here, Debord's termi- 
nation slip contained the reasons for her termination, 
and she has not shown that Mercy deviated from its 
usual disciplinary practices. 
Fourth, citing an Eighth Circuit case, Debord 
says Mercy is not entitled to summary judgment 
when one of Ammons's reasons for terminating her 
was the falsity of her sexual harassment complaint. 
See Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir.2011). 
In Pye, the Eighth Circuit found a genuine issue 
of material fact when the employer's sole reason for 
terminating the plaintiff was the plaintiff's com- 
plaint of racial discrimination in the workplace. See 
641 F.3d at 1021. But here, Ammons had a number of 
reasons — unrelated to Debord's complaint of sexual 
harassment - to support his conclusion that Debord's 
behavior was inappropriate, disruptive, and dishon- 
est. 
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Fifth, Debord argues that terminating her for her 
disruptive text messages was pretextual because she 
was merely communicating about a pending investi- 
gation into harassment. She points to Loudermilk v. 
Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir.2011), where the 
employer terminated the plaintiff for taking photo- 
graphs at work. The Seventh Circuit concluded the 
employer evinced a retaliatory motive. The court rea- 
soned, "If . . . Loudermilk snapped the photos [in 
order] to bolster his claim of discrimination, then for- 
bidding picture-taking looks a lot like an attempt to 
block the gathering of evidence during an investiga- 
tion." Id. at 315. 
Here, instead of trying to gather evidence, 
Debord's text messages merely shared information 
with co-workers about an investigation that company 
policy dictates should be confidential. For example, 
Debord sent: "[Weaver] emptied out the drawer where 
all the call back papers were kept at work. Guilty 
as charged!" Aplt.App. 301. And: "To get rid of them. 
He's being investigated . . . but he doesn't know it. 
[Ammons] will be calling the techs . . . asking about 
his conduct . . . the lewd comments and t[]ouching." 
Id. at 302-03. Debord is not gathering evidence with 
these messages. 
Further, unlike the employer's no-photography 
rule in Loudermilk, Mercy's confidential-investigation 
rule was not generated after the fact. In fact, the rule 
is stated in Mercy's harassment training materials. 
Debord had received this training, the materials were 
available online, and Debord does not allege that this 
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policy was only selectively enforced. Debord cannot 
show pretext here. 
Sixth and finally, Debord claims Mercy failed to 
investigate Debord's allegation that a male co-worker 
made more money than she did. But Debord did not 
raise this argument before the district court, so 
we will reverse only if Debord "shows the district 
court's decision amounted to plain error." Somerlott v. 
Cherokee Nation Distribs., 686 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th 
Cir.2012). This Debord cannot do, because she did not 
present evidence that her pay-disparity complaint 
was ignored. Instead, she admitted that "the reason" 
Ammons first agreed to meet with her on July 6 was 
to discuss her claim of disparity in pay, Aplt. Br. at 
52, and that shows good faith on Ammons's part, not 
pretext. 
In sum, it is not reasonable to conclude Ammons 
fired Debord because she exercised her right to report 
sexual harassment. There were many nonretaliatory 
reasons for terminating Debord, and Mercy's man- 
agement investigated the sexual harassment com- 
plaint even when Debord did not pursue the claim 
herself. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for Mercy. 
C. Cross-Appeal: Costs 
After granting summary judgment against all 
claims, the district court, without explanation, or- 
dered each party to bear its own costs. Having com- 
pletely prevailed, Mercy filed a post-judgment motion 
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for costs. The court denied the motion because co- 
defendant Weaver lost his counterclaim against 
Debord, and Weaver and Mercy shared counsel. 
Mercy cross-appeals for costs. 
Debord contends that Mercy's post-judgment 
motion was untimely. Before the district court, Mercy 
styled its motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend a judgment. But as Debord points out, the 
Supreme Court declared in Buchanan v. Stanships, 
Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 108 S.Ct. 1130, 99 L.Ed.2d 289 
(1988), that a motion for costs "does not seek 'to alter 
or amend the judgment' within the meaning of Rule 
59(e). Instead, such a request for costs raises issues 
wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of 
action, issues to which Rule 59(e) was not intended to 
apply." Id. at 268-69, 108 S.Ct. 1130. Thus, according 
to Debord, Mercy's motion should be treated as a Rule 
54(d)(1) motion, and as such, it had to be filed 7 days 
after the clerk's entry of judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.R 
54(d)(1) ("[Cjosts . . . should be allowed to the prevail- 
ing party. . . . The clerk may tax costs on 14 days' 
notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the 
court may review the clerk's action."). Because Mercy 
filed its motion 21 days after the entry of judgment, 
Debord concludes the motion was untimely. 
We need not decide the timeliness of Mercy's 
costs motion because, even if the motion was un- 
timely, the district court had discretion to consider it. 
See Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th 
Cir.2005) ("We review for abuse of discretion a district 
court's decision whether or not to consider such an 
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untimely motion.")- And here, the court properly 
exercised that discretion. We presume a prevailing 
party is entitled to costs. Zeran v. Diamond Broad., 
Inc., 203 F.3d 714, 721-22 (10th Cir.2000). Thus, 
while the district court may still withhold costs from 
a prevailing party, the court must provide valid rea- 
sons for doing so. Id. When a district court denies the 
prevailing party costs without explanation, we vacate 
the costs decision and remand for an explanation 
or reconsideration. See, e.g., Utah. Animal Rights 
Coal. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 566 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th 
Cir.2009). And here, in its original judgment, the 
court did not explain why it denied costs to Mercy. 
Therefore, for efficiency's sake, it was proper for the 
district court to rectify that omission by responding to 
Mercy's post-judgment motion for costs. 
That said, the district court's reasons for denying 
Mercy costs were invalid. "[T]o deny a prevailing 
party its costs is 'in the nature of a severe penalty,' 
such that there 'must be some apparent reason to 
penalize the prevailing party if costs are to be de- 
nied.'" Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 
1182 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting Klein v. Grynherg, 44 
F.3d 1497, 1507 (10th Cir.1995)). Thus, the district 
court's discretion to deny the prevailing party costs 
is "not unlimited." Cantrell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 458 (10th 
Cir.1995) (en banc). The circumstances in which a 
district court may properly deny costs to a prevailing 
party include when (1) the prevailing party is "only 
partially successful," (2) the prevailing party was 
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"obstructive and acted in bad faith during the course 
of the litigation," (3) damages are "only nominal," 
(4) the nonprevailing party is indigent, (5) costs are 
"unreasonably high or unnecessary," or (6) the issues 
are "close and difficult." See id. at 459. 
The district court here offered none of those 
reasons. Instead, relying on our decision in Roberts v. 
Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.1990), the court 
reasoned that denying costs to Mercy is appropriate 
because "'both parties have "prevailed" on at least 
one claim,'" which, according to the district court, 
happened here because Debord prevailed against 
Weaver's counterclaim, even though she lost all her 
claims against Mercy and Weaver. Aple.App. 1014 
(quoting Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1058). The court further 
reasoned that separating Mercy and Weaver's defense 
costs from Weaver's counterclaim costs would have 
been "impracticable" given that Mercy and Weaver 
shared counsel and relied on overlapping facts. 
Aple.App. 1015. 
These reasons do not justify withholding costs 
from Mercy. The court's reliance on our decision in 
Roberts is misplaced, because in Roberts, we upheld 
a costs award to a prevailing defendant where it 
prevailed "on the vast majority of issues and on the 
issues truly contested at trial." 921 F.2d at 1058. 
Here, by contrast, Mercy prevailed on all issues, and 
yet the district court denied Mercy costs. While 
perhaps applicable to Weaver, Roberts does not apply 
to Mercy. 
34a 
The district court's other reasons are not support- 
ive either. We do not want to discourage an efficient 
allocation of resources, so merely sharing counsel 
with a co-defendant who files an unsuccessful coun- 
terclaim does not make a fully prevailing party in- 
eligible for costs. And overlapping facts may justify 
deducting some costs during the taxing process, but it 
is not a basis for altogether denying a prevailing 
party costs. After all, Debord brought Weaver into the 
case as a codefendant, and Weaver chose to bring a 
counterclaim; Mercy had no say, as far as we can tell, 
in either decision. 
In sum, the district court did not provide an ade- 
quate basis for refusing costs to Mercy. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order 
of the district court granting summary judgment to 
Mercy, and we REVERSE the entry of judgment re- 
quiring each party to bear its own costs and RE- 
MAND to provide Mercy with an opportunity to 
submit a bill of costs consistent with this opinion. 
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Opinion 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
SAM A. CROW, Senior District Judge. 
This case comes before the Court on the following 
motions for summary judgment: defendant Mercy 
Health System of Kansas' (Mercy) motion for sum- 
mary judgment on Plaintiff Sara DeBord's sexual ha- 
rassment and retaliation claims; defendant Leonard 
Weaver's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's 
assault and battery claim; and Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on Weaver's counterclaim for def- 
amation. 
36a 
I. Summary Judgment Standard 
On summary judgment, the initial burden is with 
the movant to point out the portions of the record 
which show that the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.1992), 
cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 
L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the non- 
movant must set forth specific facts which would 
be admissible as evidence from which a rational fact 
finder could find in the non-movant's favor. Adler 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th 
Cir.1998). The non-movant must show more than 
some "metaphysical doubt" based on "evidence" and 
not "speculation, conjecture or surmise." Matsushita 
Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bones v. 
Honeywell Intern., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir.2004). 
The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence pre- 
sents a sufficient disagreement to require submission 
to the jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided 
that one party must prevail as a matter of law." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
In applying this standard, all inferences arising 
from the record must be drawn in favor of the 
nonmovant. Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 331 F.3d 1213, 
1216 (10th Cir.2003). Credibility determinations and 
the weighing of the evidence are jury functions, not 
those of a judge. Id. at 1216. Nevertheless, "the non- 
movant must establish, at a minimum, 'an inference 
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of the existence of each element essential to [her] 
case.'" Croy v. COBE Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.3d 
1199, 1201 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Hulsey v. Kmart, 
Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir.1994)). 
11. Facts 
The relevant and admissible facts, construed in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff follow. Addi- 
tional facts are set forth in the Court's analysis of the 
arguments. 
Plaintiff worked in Mercy's radiology department 
in Independence, Kansas from March 19, 2004 to July 
13, 2009, when she was terminated. She reported 
directly to Weaver, who was the director of radiology 
from 1996 until October 2010, when he chose to step 
down from that position. 
Weaver has unusually cold hands and would 
often say to Plaintiff and her co-workers "feel my cold 
hands," then touch the employees' upper arms or the 
back of their necks. Responses to this practice varied. 
One employee told Weaver "don't touch me." Another 
asked him to keep rubbing, while several said, "your 
hands are cold, get them off me." Plaintiff's response 
was to pull away. Weaver would sometimes rub 
Plaintiff's back, and she would tell him "Stop, that 
hurts," although it didn't hurt. Weaver touched Plain- 
tiff approximately three times a week. Plaintiff never 
contacted administration to report Weaver's touching, 
and Plaintiff knows of no co-employee who did so 
during her employment. 
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On July 6, 2009, Weaver made negative com- 
ments to Plaintiff about her work productivity, which 
upset Plaintiff. Later that day, Weaver went to the 
room where Plaintiff was working, put his arm 
around her and said, "You know I didn't mean it." 
Plaintiff spun away, saying, "You just don't talk to 
people like that." This event, which the Court refers 
to as a hug for purposes of convenience, is the sole 
basis for plaintiff's assault and battery claims. 
Later that day, because Plaintiff was upset with 
Weaver, she posted statements about him on her 
Facebook account. She did so three separate times, 
during work hours, via her cell phone, stating: 
1. Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds 
an extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I 
didn't even work . . . awesome!! 
2. SB is sooo disappointed . . . can't believe 
what a snake my boss is ... I know, I know 
everyone warned me. 
3. ... he adds money on peoples checks if 
he likes them (I've been one of them) . . . and 
he needs to keep his creapy (sic) hands to 
himself. . . just an all around d-bag!! 
(Ellipses in original). 
Plaintiff and other employees testified that Mr. 
Weaver had a habit of putting his unusually cold 
hands on their bare arms or on the back of their 
necks. When was asked what she meant by her 
"creepy hands" Facebook comment, Plaintiff stated 
that it referred to Mr. Weaver's cold hands: 
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Q. And in your Facebook posts when you 
said "creepy hands," were you intending to 
describe something other than cold hands? 
A. No. Just that it just gave me the creeps. 
I mean, it was such an everyday thing that it 
got to where I could be sitting somewhere 
and he could come into the area and I 
wouldn't even have to look, my skin would 
crawl. I just knew he was there. 
Plaintiff's depo., p. 198-94 [sic]. 
Some radiology department employees, including 
Weaver, became aware of Plaintiff's Facebook posts 
that same day. That afternoon Weaver took the posts 
to Eric Ammons, the Director of Human Resources, 
who was meeting with Plaintiff about an unrelated 
matter. Ammons asked Plaintiff if she had made the 
posts, and she denied it. Weaver then brought in his 
laptop and showed the posts to them. Ammons asked 
Plaintiff a second time if she had made the posts. 
Again Plaintiff denied having made them. After 
Weaver left, Ammons told Plaintiff that he would 
investigate who made the Facebook posts, as well as 
her Facebook allegations about Weaver. 
On the morning of July 8th, Ammons met with 
Plaintiff. He told her if she had made the Facebook 
posts, it would be better for her to admit it. Plaintiff 
then admitted that she had made the posts, and 
Ammons responded that he had already discovered 
that. Ammons then told Plaintiff she was suspended 
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for one day without pay. Plaintiff's suspension form 
states: 
Work related conduct needing improvement: 
Failure to conduct yourself in a manner con- 
sistent with a high degree of personal integ- 
rity and professionalism, which is expected 
of Mercy coworkers. Engaged in behavior 
deemed harmful to a fellow co-worker. Sup- 
porting details: See attached Facebook doc- 
uments. During counseling Sara admitted to 
posting information on Facebook. 
Ammons depo., p. 5, Exh. C. 
After Ammons informed Plaintiff of her suspen- 
sion, he asked Plaintiff about the "creepy hands" 
comment, and Plaintiff replied that Weaver was a 
"perv." Ammons asked what she meant by that, and 
Plaintiff replied that Weaver had made comments 
about her body and would run his hands up inside the 
arm of her scrubs and down inside the back neck of 
the scrubs. Ammons asked Plaintiff if she considered 
that to be sexual harassment, and Plaintiff denied 
that it was, saying, "No, he is just a pervert." 
Ammons told Plaintiff that because the hospital takes 
such matters seriously, he would refer the matter to 
Lana Brewster, the risk manager. 
Ammons also told Plaintiff that he had the call- 
back papers. Those papers contained the information 
which would reveal whether Plaintiff's paychecks 
were incorrect, as she had alleged on Facebook. Later 
that afternoon, Plaintiff sent five text messages while 
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at work to co-employee Tena Walsh, including the 
statements: "Leonard emptied out the drawer where 
all the call back papers were kept at work. Guilty as 
charged. To get rid of them." Ammons became aware 
that Plaintiff was talking about the matter in the 
department during working hours, and specifically 
instructed Plaintiff to keep the matter confidential. 
The next day, July 9th, Brewster met with Plain- 
tiff at Ammons' request. Brewster thought that Plain- 
tiff's comment about "creepy hands" might indicate 
sexual harassment. Plaintiff denied having made and 
wanting to make a formal report of sexual ha- 
rassment, but said she had made a verbal report 
to Ammons. Brewster asked Plaintiff to describe 
Weaver's conduct, beginning with the most recent to 
the most remote, and Plaintiff did so. Plaintiff told 
Brewster of other statements of a sexual nature 
that Weaver had made to her throughout the years. 
Brewster told Plaintiff to let her know if she had any 
more problems. Brewster interviewed Weaver and 
Kim Harris, a long-time radiology department em- 
ployee, before concluding that Weaver had not vio- 
lated Mercy's sexual harassment policy. 
Four days later, Plaintiff was terminated. Ammons 
decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment, and 
John Woodridge, CEO, and Reta Baker, COO, con- 
curred. Ammons believed that Plaintiff had been 
dishonest in denying that she had made the Facebook 
posts, in denying that she had made the Facebook 
posts while at work, in making unfounded accusa- 
tions against Weaver about her paycheck, and in 
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breaching confidentiality. Ammons believed that 
Plaintiff had been disruptive in openly discussing 
the investigation and in texting on the 8th, after 
he instructed her to keep the matter confidential. 
Ammons told Plaintiff she was terminated for disrup- 
tion, continued texting, and dishonesty. Plaintiff's 
termination form states that she was terminated for 
"work related conduct needing improvement: Inap- 
propriate and disruptive Behavior. Dishonest." Dk. 
147, Exh. M. 
Discovery in this case revealed that in 2007, 
Plaintiff had in fact been overpaid approximately 
$475 (not $600) for overtime that she had not worked. 
This mistake was due to Plaintiff's clock-in error 
which Weaver failed to catch in his routine review of 
the records. Ammons had looked at records from 
2006, but not from 2007, when investigating Plain- 
tiff's Facebook comments about Weaver, but had 
found no overpayment. So at the time of Plaintiff's 
termination, Ammons disbelieved Plaintiff's com- 
ment about having been overpaid. 
After her termination, Plaintiff sued Mercy for 
retaliatory termination, and for sexual harassment. 
Plaintiff sued Weaver for civil assault and battery 
based on the alleged July 6th hug. Weaver counter- 
claimed for defamation, based on some statements 
Plaintiff made on Facebook and in her text messages, 
and similar statements Plaintiff made orally. The 
Court first addresses the Plaintiff's Title VII claims 
against Mercy for retaliation and sexual harassment, 
then addresses the individual's tort claims. 
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III. Retaliation 
Plaintiff lacks direct evidence of retaliation, 
so must meet the three-part test established in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to prove retaliation 
indirectly. 
Under the McDonnell Douglas /indirect ap- 
proach, the plaintiff must first make out a 
prima facie case of retaliation by showing 
(1) that [s]he engaged in protected opposition 
to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable em- 
ployee would have found the challenged ac- 
tion materially adverse, and (3) that a causal 
connection existed between the protected ac- 
tivity and the materially adverse action. If 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
the employer must then offer a legitimate, 
nonretaliatory reason for its decision. Fi- 
nally, once the employer has satisfied this 
burden of production, the plaintiff must show . 
that the employer's reason is merely a pre- 
text for retaliation. 
Tivigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998 
(10th Cir.2011) (citations and quotations omitted). 
Defendant challenges the first and third ele- 
ments of the prima facie case, contending that plain- 
tiff has not shown protected opposition1 or a causal 
1
 Plaintiff relies, in part, on cases under Title VII's partici- 
pation clause, rather than the opposition clause. But the pretrial 
order includes no claim under the participation clause, and 
(Continued on following page) 
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connection. The Court assumes, without deciding, 
that Plaintiff has made a prima facie case of retalia- 
tion. Mercy has offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory 
reason for its decision - namely, that Plaintiff was 
terminated for her inappropriate and disruptive be- 
havior and her dishonesty. This shifts the burden to 
the plaintiff to show that the employer's reasons are 
merely a pretext for retaliation. Bryant v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, in which this court held that, 
"As a general rule, an employee must proffer evidence 
that shows each of the employer's justifications is 
pretextual." Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 432 
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.2005); Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 
1089, 1093 (10th Cir.2011). 
Pretext 
To determine whether a proffered reason for a 
decision is pretextual, the court examines the facts as 
they appear to the person making the decision, not as 
they appear to the plaintiff in her subjective evalua- 
tion of the situation. Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 
1093-94 (10th Cir.2011). "The relevant inquiry is not 
whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise, 
fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those 
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs." 
Id. 
alleges only protected opposition. See Dk. 141, p. 10, § 6.1 para. 
2; id, p. 11, § 6.2 para. 2. 
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Plaintiff contends that her statements on Face- 
book and her texts were true. She thus contends that 
she was not dishonest, and that Mercy's finding that 
Weaver had not added money to her paycheck was 
false. The Court recognizes that falsity evidence is 
useful in retaliation cases as one means of establish- 
ing pretext. Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1001. But here, the 
circumstances cannot lead the trier of fact to reason- 
ably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the 
employer was dissembling to cover up a retaliatory 
purpose. 
The facts show that Ammons believed at the time 
of Plaintiff's termination that her paychecks were 
accurate. It was not discovered until discovery during 
this lawsuit that Plaintiff had, in fact, been overpaid 
approximately $475 due to Plaintiff's clock-in error, 
which Weaver failed to discover in his routine review 
of the records. At the time of Plaintiff's termination, 
Ammons had reviewed the call-back logs from 2006, 
had determined that those paychecks were in the 
correct amounts, and therefore believed that Plain- 
tiff 's statements about her boss having added money 
to her paycheck were false. Ammons' failure to review 
the records for 2007 which would have revealed the 
overpayment, although perhaps erroneous, raises no 
inference of pretext. 
Plaintiff attacks Ammons' belief that Plaintiff 
had been disruptive in openly discussing the investi- 
gation and in texting on the 8th, after Ammons 
instructed Plaintiff to keep the matter confidential. 
Plaintiff contends that Ammons did not tell her to 
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keep the matter confidential until after she had sent 
the texts, making Ammons' statement false. But even 
assuming that Plaintiff is correct, Plaintiff has not 
cast any doubt upon the independent reason of given 
for her termination - dishonesty. 
The facts show that Plaintiff made the Facebook 
posts via her cell phone during work hours; that 
employees saw and discussed the Facebook posts at 
work; that Ammons asked Plaintiff about them; and 
that Plaintiff denied having made those posts. Plain- 
tiff lied to Ammons about that fact twice. Further, it 
is uncontested that after Ammons told Plaintiff that 
he had the call-back logs, Plaintiff told other employ- 
ees that Weaver had taken and destroyed them. No 
facts suggest that Ammons did not reasonably or 
sincerely believe that Plaintiff's acts were inappro- 
priate, disruptive, or dishonest. These acts provided 
an independent and good faith basis for Plaintiff's 
termination, even assuming the truth of her Facebook 
statements about her paycheck and the truth of her 
version of when Ammons told her to keep the matter 
confidential. 
Plaintiff's excuses for her dishonest acts are im- 
material because in this inqmry, her state of mind 
is irrelevant. Nothing in the record suggests that 
Ammons did not believe the reasons stated for Plain- 
tiff 's termination. No facts suggest that retaliation 
for Plaintiff's complaints of gender discrimination played 
a part in the employment decision. Fye v. Okla. Corp. 
Comm'n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir.2008). Instead, 
Ammons, the primary decisionmaker in Plaintiff's 
47a 
termination, was the very person who had initiated 
the sexual harassment investigation by referring 
Plaintiff's vague complaints to the risk manager just 
the week before. Ammons thought Weaver's conduct 
was inappropriate, despite Plaintiff's repeated de- 
nials to Ammons that she perceived Weaver's acts as 
sexual harassment. Because no facts justify an infer- 
ence that Ammons harbored any retaliatory motive, 
summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's claim 
of retaliation. 
IV. Sexual Harassment - Employer Liability 
Plaintiff contends that Weaver sexually harassed 
her at work over the course of her employment with 
Mercy. In support of her hostile work environment 
claim, she offers evidence, some of which Mercy con- 
tends should be excluded. Mercy additionally con- 
tends that Weaver's acts were not sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment, and 
that in any event, Mercy cannot be held liable for 
them. Plaintiff argues that defendant is liable both 
vicariously and directly, but raises no alter ego theory. 
The Court addresses the issue of employer liability 
first, without resolving whether Weaver's alleged ha- 
rassment of Plaintiff was actionable. 
A. Vicarious Liability 
Plaintiff does not contend that Weaver's harass- 
ment culminated in her termination, or in any other 
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tangible employment action.2 Accordingly, the Faragher/ 
Ellerth defense may be available. The Faragher/ 
Ellerth framework is designed "to accommodate the 
principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by 
misuse of supervisory authority," and to accommodate 
"Title YII's equally basic policies of encouraging 
forethought by employers and saving action by object- 
ing employees." Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1285 
(10th Cir.2011); quoting Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 
662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). 
Under the Faragher/Ellerth framework, the 
defendant bears the burden to show two elements: 
"The defense comprises two necessary ele- 
ments: (a) that the employer exercised rea- 
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any preventive or correc- 
tive opportunities provided by the employer 
or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher, 524 
U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. 
Helm, 656 F.3d at 1285. These elements are ad- 
dressed below. 
2
 The pretrial order and plaintiff's memo (Dk. 155) contend 
that harassment affected the terms and conditions of her em- 
ployment only, and that retaliation caused her termination. 
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1. Employer's Reasonable Care to Pre- 
vent 
The record reveals that Mercy implemented a 
sexual harassment policy that strictly prohibits sex- 
ual harassment, contains a complaint procedure list- 
ing multiple persons to whom harassment may be 
reported, and includes an anti-retaliation provision. 
Mercy distributed the policy to all of its employees via 
its employee handbook. Mercy trained its employees 
on that policy during employment orientation and 
during its annual corporate compliance education 
program, which it required all employees to attend. 
Plaintiff attended the orientation training which 
included a discussion of the sexual harassment policy, 
and received a Power Point presentation each year 
from Human Resources. She also completed the cor- 
porate compliance program annually, which provided 
continuing education on Mercy's sexual harassment 
policy. These facts establish, as a matter of law, that 
Mercy exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual ha- 
rassment. See Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288-89. 
2. Employer's Reasonable Care to Cor- 
rect 
The Court next asks whether the employer acted 
reasonably to remedy any harassment that occurred, 
despite the reasonable preventative measures. 
... in order "to establish that it took proper ac- 
tion to correct harassment, [the defendant] was 
required to show that it acted reasonably 
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promptly on [plaintiff's] complaint when it 
was given proper notice of her allegations as 
required under its complaint procedures." 
Frederick [u. Sprint/United Management Co.], 
246 F.3d [1305] at 1314 [(11th Cir.2001)]. 
"The most significant immediate measure an 
employer can take in response to a sexual 
harassment complaint is to launch a prompt 
investigation to determine whether the com- 
plaint is justified." Swenson v. Potter, 271 
F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2001); see also 
Cerros [o. Steel Technologies, Inc.], 398 F.3d 
[944] at 954 [(7th Cir.2005)] ("Our cases rec- 
ognize prompt investigation of the alleged 
misconduct as a hallmark of reasonable cor- 
rective action."). 
Helm, 656 F.3d at 1290. Plaintiff contends that this 
requirement is not met because Brewster failed to 
investigate Plaintiff's allegations of harassment, and 
Weaver was not disciplined as a result of Plaintiff's 
complaint.3 
Plaintiff's Facebook comments did not constitute 
"proper notice" sufficient to trigger defendant's duty 
to take corrective action. See Helm, 656 F.3d at 1290- 
91, and cases cited therein. But even assuming the 
contrary, an adequate investigation was timely begun. 
3
 Plaintiff also contends that this element is not met be- 
cause Weaver had harassed many employees since 2001. Plain- 
tiff's argument confounds the analysis of vicarious and direct 
liability. See Dk. 155, p. 59-61. 
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Plaintiff's Facebook posts were made on July 6th, 
and Brewster's investigation began on July 9th. 
Plaintiff's conversation with Ammons on July 
6th, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plain- 
tiff, arguably provided such notice. Three days later, 
Mercy's risk manager, whose responsibility it was to 
investigate reports of sexual harassment, initiated a 
meeting with Plaintiff to ask about sexual harass- 
ment. Ammons had asked Brewster to look at the 
matter, and because of the "creepy hands" comment, 
Brewster thought she was looking at a sexual har- 
assment complaint. When Brewster met with Plain- 
tiff, Plaintiff said she had verbalized a complaint to 
H.R. against Weaver, but did not want to file a for- 
mal complaint. Brewster asked Plaintiff to describe 
Weaver's conduct, beginning with the most recent to 
the most remote, and Plaintiff did so. Brewster told 
Plaintiff to let her know if she had any more prob- 
lems. Brewster also interviewed Weaver, who denied 
the bulk of Plaintiff's allegations but admitted put- 
ting his cold hands on employees. Brewster told 
Weaver "if anything was going on, to cease." Brewster 
depo. p. 36-37. After speaking with Plaintiff, Brewster 
interviewed a long-time radiology department em- 
ployee, Kim Harris, who did not confirm any hostility 
or sexual tension in the department. Brewster con- 
cluded that Weaver had not violated company policy. 
Because the investigation was adequate and did 
not reveal that Weaver was sexually harassing Plain- 
tiff or other employees, Mercy's failure to discipline 
Weaver or terminate his employment does not show 
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lack of reasonable care. The Court finds that Mercy 
acted reasonably and timely to remedy any harass- 
ment of which it was aware. 
3. Plaintiff's Failure to Use Preventive 
or Corrective Opportunities 
The Court next examines whether Mercy has met 
its burden to show that the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor- 
rective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
avoid harm otherwise. "[T]he law against sexual ha- 
rassment is not self-enforcing and an employer can- 
not be expected to correct harassment unless the 
employee makes a concerted effort to inform the em- 
ployer that a problem exists." Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 
180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quota- 
tions omitted). Plaintiff contends that Weaver's sex- 
ual harassment of her began in 2004 and continued 
throughout her employment, but she concedes that 
she never reported Weaver's acts before July 6, 2009. 
This delay, if unexplained, is unreasonable, given 
Plaintiff's awareness of her ability to report harass- 
ing conduct. 
Plaintiff first argues that her failure to report 
earlier was reasonable because she had "objective 
fears of significant retaliation for complaining." Dk. 
155, p. 62. But the record fails to show any objective 
basis for such a fear. Mercy had an anti-retaliation 
policy, and Plaintiff shows no facts suggesting that 
this policy was not enforced. For purposes of this 
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affirmative defense, a generalized fear of retaliation 
simply is not sufficient to explain even "long delays" 
of two to four months in reporting sexual harassment. 
Pinkerton v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 
1063 (10th Cir.2009). Here, Plaintiff delayed for 
approximately five years before she arguably reported 
Weaver's acts. 
Plaintiff also contends that she believed any 
report would be futile because Mercy "also employs 
Weaver's wife . . . who is one of only two surgeons at 
this small-town hospital." Id. But this fact is not part 
of the record, since it is not included in either party's 
uncontroverted statement of fact.4 Even considering 
that evidence, however, and viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff, the testimony estab- 
lishes only that Weaver's wife was employed as one of 
Mercy's two general surgeons on the date of Plain- 
tiff's deposition. Without showing that Dr. Herrin 
was employed by Mercy from 2004 through 2009, 
Plaintiff's futility argument lacks an essential link. 
Plaintiff believes that reporting Weaver's conduct 
would have been useless because if Weaver were 
terminated, his wife, Dr. Herrin, would leave the 
hospital, and Mercy would not want to lose her. Depo. 
Vol. 1, p. 195. But Plaintiff shows no factual basis 
for speculating that Mercy would ignore a sexual 
4
 See D. Kan. R. 56.1(b)(2). Plaintiff cites this record in im- 
properly attempting to controvert Defendant's facts, but does not 
include it in her own statement of material facts. 
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harassment complaint against Weaver, or that Dr. 
Herring would leave Mercy if Weaver left. Plaintiff 
admits no one ever told her this would happen, and 
she provides no factual basis for her belief. "An 
employee's subjective belief in the futility of reporting 
a harasser's behavior is not a reasonable basis for 
failing to take advantage of any preventive or correc- 
tive opportunities provided by the employer. See 
Lissau [d. Southern Food Service, Inc.], 159 F.3d [177] 
at 182 [(4th Cir.1998)]." Barrett v. Applied Radiant 
Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir.2001). 
Because Mercy has presented undisputed evi- 
dence establishing that it acted reasonably to prevent 
and to respond to sexual harassment, and that Plain- 
tiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of its pre- 
ventive opportunities, Mercy is not vicariously liable 
for Weaver's acts. 
B. Direct Liability 
Plaintiff additionally contends that Mercy is 
directly liable for its own negligence. An employer 
may be directly liable if it fails to remedy or prevent a 
hostile work environment of which management-level 
employees5 knew or should have known. See Adler v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th 
Cir.1998). To determine whether an employer is liable 
for negligence in allowing employees to engage in 
6
 Plaintiff does not attempt to show that Weaver was a 
management-level employee for purposes of direct liability. 
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sexual harassment, this court makes two inquiries: 
"first, into the employer's actual or constructive 
knowledge of harassment, and second, into the ade- 
quacy of the employer's remedial and preventative 
responses to any actually or constructively known 
harassment." Adler, 144 F.3d at 673. 
1. Actual Knowledge 
Actual knowledge will be demonstrable in most 
cases where the plaintiff has reported harassment to 
management-level employees. Adler, 144 F.3d at 673. 
Plaintiff admits that she did not report the alleged 
sexual harassment to administration any time before 
2009, when Ammons spoke to her about her Facebook 
posts. 
In contending that Mercy had actual knowledge 
of Weaver's acts, Plaintiff points to one event in 2001, 
before she was hired.6 Plaintiff believes that a fe- 
male employee resigned in 2001 because Weaver had 
touched her with his cold hands, had made negative 
comments about the Catholic religion, and had asked 
her if she'd considered artificial insemination. Al- 
though evidence of a perpetrator's bad acts toward 
other employees may sometimes be useful in imput- 
ing knowledge to the employer, this is not such an 
occasion. 
6
 The Court assumes, for purposes of this discussion, that 
evidence of this event is admissible. 
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The Tenth Circuit requires that such evidence be 
similar in nature and near in time. A plaintiff may 
rely on the employer's 
notice of any evidence of sexual harassment 
by [the harasser] that is similar in nature 
and near in time to his sexual harassment of 
[the Plaintiff] in order to raise a genuine is- 
sue of material fact as to whether [the em- 
ployer] knew or should have known of [the 
harasser's] conduct. 
Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 
F.3d 777, 784 (10th Cir.1995), abrogated on other 
grounds as recognized in Zisumbo v. McCleodUSA 
Telecommunications Services, Inc., 154 Fed.Appx. 715 
(10th Cir.2005). In determining whether to consider 
acts alleged by other employees, the Court looks to 
"[t]he extent and seriousness of the earlier harass- 
ment and the similarity and nearness in time to the 
later harassment. . . ." Tademy v. Union Pacific Corp., 
614 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th Cir.2008), quoting Hirase- 
Doi. But Weaver's harassment of Plaintiff, which 
allegedly began in 2004, even if similar in nature, is 
not sufficiently near in time to the 2001 event to raise 
a triable issue regarding Mercy's actual knowledge of 
any hostile work environment to which Plaintiff may 
have been subjected, given the lack of intervening 
complaints. 
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2. Constructive Knowledge 
Plaintiff relies on a constructive knowledge 
theory in contending that Mercy had notice of the 
sexually hostile environment "[biased solely on the 
large number of women who were sexually harassed 
by Weaver ..." Dk. 155, p. 59. By this, Plaintiff re- 
fers mostly to Weaver's putting his cold hands on co- 
workers, who never reported that conduct. But only 
when the acts of harassment are "'so egregious, nu- 
merous, and concentrated as to add up to a campaign 
of harassment' " will the employer be liable for failure 
to discover the harassment. Adler, 144 F.3d at 675 
(quoting Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 
1346 (10th Cir.1990)). The Court cannot find con- 
structive knowledge of sexual harassment based 
solely on the frequency with which Weaver put his 
cold hands on employees. "[T]o infer employer knowl- 
edge from only the level of pervasiveness essential to 
make out a hostile environment claim would be il- 
logical because if that were the rule, knowledge would 
be attributed to employers in all cases of hostile work 
environment founded on pervasiveness." Ford v. West, 
222 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir.2000). The facts in this 
case fall short of the egregious conduct or campaign of 
harassment necessary to impose constructive knowl- 
edge on an employer. 
Because no question of material fact has been 
shown regarding any basis for employer liability, 
summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's sexual 
harassment claim against Mercy. Where a court dis- 
poses of a claim based on the absence of employer 
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liability, it need not resolve, apart from the question 
of employer liability, the issue of the presence of a 
hostile work environment. See Ford, 222 F.3d 767; 
Adler, 144 F.3d at 672. 
V. Civil Assault and Battery 
Defendant Weaver moves for summary judgment 
on Plaintiff's claim of assault and battery, which is 
based solely on the hug defendant Weaver allegedly 
attempted to give plaintiff at work on July 6th, 2009. 
A. Facts 
Defendant denies that he ever attempted to hug 
Plaintiff, but admits that the facts, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, show the follow- 
ing: 
On July 6, 2009, plaintiff commented to de- 
fendant Weaver that she would be doing 
mammograms all day and that no one would 
see her. Defendant Weaver responded, 
"How's that different from any other day? All 
you do is sit on your butt in your room." 
Plaintiff responded, "I have the highest 
productivity the department." When defen- 
dant Weaver disagreed, plaintiff replied, 
"Are you trying to tell me I'm worthless?" De- 
fendant Weaver responded, "If that's how you 
want to put it." Plaintiff went to her work 
area and started crying. A little later, de- 
fendant Weaver entered the nuclear medi- 
cine room, put his arm around plaintiff, and 
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said, ''You know I didn't mean it." Plaintiff 
spun away, saying, "You just don't talk to 
people like that." Plaintiff admits that de- 
fendant Weaver "didn't fully complete the 
hug" due to her evasive actions. 
Doc. 155, p. 64. 
B. Intent to Harm 
"The gravamen of a civil assault and battery is 
grounded upon the actor's intention to inflict injury." 
Baska v. Scherzer, 283 Kan. 750, 156 P.3d 617 (2007). 
Defendant Weaver contends that Plaintiff has failed 
to raise a material question of fact on the element of 
intent to harm. 
Under Kansas law, the tort of assault is defined 
as "an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with 
apparent ability, to do bodily harm to another, result- 
ing in immediate apprehension of bodily harm." 
Taiwo v. Vu, 249 Kan. 585, 596, 822 P.2d 1024 (1991). 
See PIK Civ. 4th 127.01. The tort of battery is defined 
as "the unprivileged touching or striking of one per- 
son by another, done with the intent of bringing about 
either a contact or an apprehension of contact, that is 
harmful or offensive." PIK Civ. 4th 127.02. 
Both parties rely on the following testimony by 
Plaintiff, relative to the issue of intent to harm. 
"Q. Do you believe he intended to harm 
you? 
A. No. I believe he intended to hug me. 
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Q. Did you - do you allege that you sus- 
tained any damage as a result of the alleged 
hug? 
A. Humiliation. 
Q. How long did you feel humiliated? 
A. I still feel humiliated. 
Plaintiff's depo., Vol. 2, p. 36. 
To the extent that Plaintiff suggests that humili- 
ation is sufficient harm for purposes of these torts, 
the Court disagrees. Emotional distress, such as hu- 
miliation, does not constitute bodily harm, either 
under the plain meaning of those terms, or under 
Kansas law. Instead, Kansas cases consistently dis- 
tinguish between bodily harm, and emotional and 
psychological injuries. See e.g.. State v. Reitz, 239 P.3d 
114 (2010); Lovitt ex rel. Bahr v. Board of County 
Com'rs of Shawnee County, 43 Kan.App.2d 4, 221 P.3d 
107 (2009). 
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff, do not tend to show that defendant 
Weaver threatened or attempted to do bodily harm to 
Plaintiff. See PIK 127.01 comment (describing an 
assault as "an apparently violent attempt, or a willful 
offer with force or violence, to do corporal injury to 
another, without the actual doing of the injury 
threatened, as by lifting the fist or a cane in a threat- 
ening manner"); Taiwo, 249 Kan. 585, 822 P.2d 1024. 
Thus summary judgment in defendant's favor is 
warranted on the assault claim. 
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As for the battery claim, Plaintiff contends that 
no showing of intent to do bodily harm is necessary, 
since battery includes an unprivileged, intentional 
touching, which the recipient finds to be offensive. 
Plaintiff contends that because of Weaver's past acts 
and comments to her, she considered the hug to be 
hostile, offensive, and sexual in nature. But it is the 
actor's intent to harm or offend, not merely the recip- 
ient's offense, that must be shown. In order to estab- 
lish a battery under Kansas law, plaintiff must show 
"an unprivileged touching or striking, done with the 
intent of bringing about either a contact or an ap- 
prehension of a contact that is harmful or offensive." 
Marten v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 993 F.Supp. 
822, 830 (D.Kan.1998). Plaintiff's tortured construc- 
tion of the elements of battery ignores that the grava- 
men of a civil assault and battery, unlike a negligence 
claim, is grounded upon the actor's intention to inflict 
injury. See Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 
Kan. 360, 366, 388 P.2d 824 (1964); Murray v. Modoc 
State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957); 
Hackenberger v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 144 Kan. 
607, 610, 611, 62 P.2d 545 (1936); Hershey v. Peake, 
115 Kan. 562, 223 P. 1113 (1924). Battery is an inten- 
tional tort, and the term "intent," as it is used in the 
law of torts, denotes that the actor desires to cause 
the consequences of his act, or that he believes that 
the consequences are substantially certain to result 
from it. Baska, 283 Kan. at 757, 156 P.3d 617, citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A(1964). 
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Nothing in the facts tends to show that Weaver 
intended to offend or harm Plaintiff by hugging her. 
When asked whether she believed that defendant 
Weaver intended to harm her, Plaintiff replied: "No. I 
believe he intended to hug me." Weaver did not testify 
about his intent because he denied that the event 
occurred. No other circumstances of record suggest 
that defendant Weaver harbored any intent either to 
harm or to offend Plaintiff by hugging her. Under 
Plaintiff's version of the facts, it is reasonable to infer 
that Weaver intended only to console her. Summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant is therefore ap- 
propriate. See Stricklin, 192 Kan. at 366, 388 P.2d 
824 (1964); Holdren u. General Motors Corp., 31 
F.Supp.2d 1279 (D.Kan. 1998). 
VI. Defamation 
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Weaver's 
counterclaim against her for defamation, contending 
that all statements she made were true and that none 
of them harmed Weaver's reputation. 
A. Facts 
Defendant Weaver claims that the following four 
statements by Plaintiff were false and defamatory: 
1. Facebook Post on July 6, 2009: "Sara 
DeBord loves it when my boss adds an extra 
$600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn't 
even work . . . awesome!" 
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2. Cellular Phone Text Message to co- 
worker Tena Walsh on July 8, 2009: "Leonard 
emptied out the drawer where all the call 
back papers were kept at work . . . Guilty as 
charged!" "To get rid of them." 
3. Oral Statement to former co-worker 
Heather Boss on July 8, 2009: "Weaver had 
destroyed and in fact shredded the callback 
logs." 
4. Oral Statement to former co-worker 
Melissa Stewart in 20 097: "Weaver took the 
callback logs from the Radiology Depart- 
ment." 
Dk. 141, p. 9; Dk. 139. Weaver believes that these 
statements falsely accuse him of two matters: 1) falsi- 
fying Plaintiff's time records and intentionally pay- 
ing her for time she did not work; and 2) removing 
the callback papers, which would have accurately re- 
flected the time Plaintiff worked, to hide his guilt. 
Under Kansas law, the elements of defamation 
are: (1) false and defamatory words; (2) communica- 
tion to a third person; and (3) harm to the reputation 
of the person defamed. Droge v. Rempel, 39 Kan.App.2d 
455, 459, 180 P.3d 1094 (2008). The Court focuses 
upon Plaintiff's claim that Weaver has failed to show 
that any of the allegedly defamatory statements 
caused harm to his reputation. 
7
 Ms. Stewart testified that plaintiff made this statement in 
2010, then corrected the date to 2009 on her errata sheet. 
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B. Harm to Reputation 
"[D]amage to one's reputation is the essence and 
gravamen of an action for defamation." Gobin v. Globe 
Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982). 
Damages recoverable for defamation cannot be pre- 
sumed but must be proven. Hall v. Kansas Farm 
Bureau, 274 Kan. 263, 276, 50 P.3d 495 (2002). "Proof 
of such damages typically entails showing that per- 
sons were deterred from associating with the plain- 
tiff, that the plaintiff's reputation had been lowered 
in the community, or that the plaintiff's profession 
suffered." Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 
F.Supp. 1362 (D.Kan. 1996). "[T]he plaintiff in an 
action for defamation must first offer proof of harm to 
reputation; any claim for mental anguish is "para- 
sitic," and compensable only after damage to reputa- 
tion has been established." Gobin, 232 Kan. at 7, 649 
P.2d 1239. Evidence must permit the jury to deter- 
mine what plaintiff's true reputation was in the com- 
munity of his residence, and to determine whether 
the publication damaged that reputation. Id. Injury 
to one's personal sensitivities is insufficient to show 
harm to one's reputation. Id. 
In this case, the parties agree that as to the third 
statement, allegedly made by Plaintiff to Heather 
Boss, Boss has no opinion concerning Weaver's char- 
acter, other than that he's a nice man. Dk. 145, p. 8, 
Dk. 154, p. 6. No evidence shows that Plaintiff's 
statement to Boss about Weaver's destruction and 
shredding of callback logs damaged Weaver's reputa- 
tion. Weaver appears to concede as much by his 
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failure to address this matter in his response. Be- 
cause no evidence provides any basis for a jury to find 
that this statement damaged Weaver's reputation, 
this statement is not actionable. 
Weaver contends that the other three statements 
damaged his reputation at work. To meet his burden 
to show damage to his reputation, Weaver offers tes- 
timony that before the statements were made, certain 
employees thought positively of him, but that after 
the statements were made, they thought differently. 
The Court examines this evidence below, focusing on 
the requisite causal connection. 
Tena Walsh, an employee in defendant's radiol- 
ogy department, was a Facebook friend with Plaintiff. 
She saw Plaintiff's Facebook Post on July 6th, which 
said: "Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds an 
extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn't even 
work . . . awesome!" She also received the following 
text messages from Plaintiff on July 8th: "Leonard 
emptied out the drawer where all the call back papers 
were kept at work . .. Guilty as charged!" "To get rid 
of them." 
When asked what her opinion was of Weaver 
before seeing the Facebook posts, Walsh testified: 
Well, obviously I didn't - you know, creepy 
when it comes to women. I can honestly say 
there was (sic) times, as far as him being a 
boss to me, there was good things that hap- 
pened too. I mean, he pushed me to go back 
and get my schooling and education, so I 
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mean, I'll give him credit for that, but this 
has gone - this whole line of everything, why 
we're here today has gone on far too long, 
and unfortunately - I'm allowed to say what 
I want to say; correct? Unfortunately, it took 
this happening to Sara and her finally doing 
something to pretty much bring this all out 
for all of us that have ever experienced any- 
thing that's gone on for all these years, so — 
and it's time he - it's totally unjustifiable, it's 
hurt a lot of people, and it's bringing out a lot 
of pain in the past for a lot of us. Me in par- 
ticular, I know. 
Walsh depo. p. 45-46. 
Walsh was then asked whether her opinion of 
Weaver had changed since seeing Plaintiff's Face- 
book posts and text messages. She replied: 
My opinion for him is - I assume he just 
wants this to be done and over with. He 
doesn't - he doesn't deserve to still be em- 
ployed with Mercy as far as I'm concerned. 
Maybe I don't either. Maybe none of us do. 
But it's really hard to see him now when I do 
see him, so — . .. I've known him because I 
started just a couple months before he did, 
and he's got away with this shit for too long. 
Got away with this stuff for too long. 
Id. 
In short, Walsh stated no opinion about Weaver's 
reputation. Nothing in her testimony raises an inference 
that she believed Weaver was padding Plaintiff's 
67a 
paycheck, was a thief, or had destroyed company 
records. Her comments about Weaver were based her 
own experiences with or observations of him, and on 
what she believed to be Weaver's sexual assault of 
her outside of work. Her cited testimony fails to show 
that Plaintiff's statements may have caused any 
change in Walsh's opinion about Weaver, if there was 
any such change. 
Angie Cessna was also aware of plaintiff's Face- 
book posts. Weaver cites Cessna's testimony that 
before the posts, "everybody probably thought he was 
a very nice guy," but now Cessna tries to avoid him 
when she visits his department. Cessna depo., pp. 51, 
54, 55, 64. But Cessna's testimony states that the 
reason she tries to avoid Weaver is because Weaver's 
own statements make her feel uncomfortable. Id., 
p. 55. She began avoiding Weaver when he started 
making strange comments, which was after Plain- 
tiff's termination. Id., p. 64. 
Further, when asked whether her opinion of 
Weaver had changed since she became aware of the 
Facebook posts, Cessna replied: 
No. I find it very funny that — that his char- 
acter is in question based on a post. I would 
be more concerned that his character would 
be in question due to the way he acted and 
the things he said in the department. That is 
- I'm laughing. I mean, that is almost comi- 
cal to me. 
Cessna depo. p. 50. As above, the causal element is 
lacking. Nothing in the cited record provides any 
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basis for a jury to find that plaintiff's Facebook posts 
about Weaver damaged Cessna's opinion of him. 
Eric Ammons, Mercy's CEO and former head of 
human resources, saw the Facebook posts and texts 
in the course of his internal investigation about them. 
He testified that he still considers Weaver to be "a 
person of honesty, a person of integrity." Ammons 
depo. p. 58. Ammons does think differently of Weaver 
after July of 2009, but that is because Weaver had 
difficulty leading the department and voluntarily 
stepped down into a staff position. Depo. p. 61- 
62. Ammons believed that Plaintiff's lawsuit made 
Weaver an ineffective leader because Weaver is afraid 
to counsel employees or take action relating to per- 
formance issues. Id., p. 62. Nothing in the cited 
testimony suggests that Ammons' opinion of Weaver 
changed because of Plaintiff's Facebook posts or 
texts. 
Additionally, Plaintiff's statements would not have 
lowered Ammons opinion of Weaver unless Ammons 
believed those statements to be true. But Ammons 
investigated Plaintiff's Facebook posts about receiv- 
ing extra money, and concluded they were not true. 
He also knew that Plaintiff's texts were false in 
alleging that Weaver had destroyed the call-back logs, 
since he had those call-back logs in his possession at 
the time. 
Melissa Stewart, a former co-worker of plain- 
tiff 's, was a Facebook friend with Plaintiff, but never 
saw or heard about Plaintiff's post that Weaver had 
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added money to plaintiff's paycheck. She did hear 
about Plaintiff's Facebook post saying "at least now 
he'll keep his creepy hands off me." Stewart depo., 
p. 12-14. Additionally, Plaintiff told her sometime in 
2009 that "Weaver took the callback logs from the 
Radiology Department." But Ms. Stewart was not 
asked if her opinion of Weaver had changed because 
of those statements. Instead, Weaver cites the follow- 
ing testimony as support for claiming damages to his 
reputation. 
Q. Do you consider Weaver a person of in- 
tegrity or honesty or morality? 
A. No. 
Stewart depo., p. 33. No causal connection is made, 
however, between this opinion and Plaintiff's al- 
legedly defamatory comments. Instead, the imme- 
diately preceding testimony clarifies that Stewart's 
opinion was based Weaver's own acts, not on Plain- 
tiff's comments: 
Q. Okay. What is your opinion of Weaver as 
a supervisor? 
A. I don't think that he should be in a posi- 
tion to supervise employees the way that he 
- the way that he is now because I feel like if 
you're a supervisor that there's - you should 
be concerned with managing your employees 
and not trying to be friends with them. I 
think he crosses the line a lot with his em- 
ployees. He's too worried about their per- 
sonal lives and being friends with them 
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instead of the job that he's supposed to be 
doing. 
Id., p. 33. 
Weaver also points to the testimony of Kari 
Dunham, another Mercy employee. But Dunham 
testified that she has no idea what Plaintiff posted on 
Facebook, has never seen any text messages about 
Weaver, and was not aware that Plaintiff sent text 
messages to Tena Walsh. Although Dunham stated 
that her opinion of Weaver had changed, that change 
was caused by rumors relating to Plaintiff's accusa- 
tions of assault. Depo., p. 12-13. Her testimony does 
not suggest any causal connection between Plaintiff's 
allegedly defamatory statements, which do not allege 
assault, and damage to Weaver's reputation. 
Testimony from Dr. Herrin, Weaver's wife, does 
not assist his damages claim. She testified that she 
was aware of her husband's reputation generally at 
the hospital. She believes he had a good reputation, is 
respected and well-liked, and that his reputation had 
not changed since Plaintiff made her Facebook posts 
or sent her text messages to Tena. Herrin depo. p. 29- 
32. Weaver told her that he didn't feel like he could be 
effective as a manager because of the threat from the 
Plaintiff's lawsuit, and because of Terri's allegations. 
Herrin depo. p. 34. 
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The sole remaining admissible testimony8 offered 
to show damage to Weaver's reputation is his own 
testimony. He stated that he felt like he had lost con- 
trol of his department partly because of Plaintiff's 
statements, but mostly because of another incident.9 
Weaver depo. p. 165. He believes that the following 
occurred as a result of Plaintiff's Facebook posts: 
people at work lost respect for him and no longer 
talked to him as much as they did before; he felt he 
could no longer effectively manage the radiology de- 
partment so he chose to step down as its director over 
a year later; and Terri Wilson was contemptuous to 
him in September of 2009. Id., p. 168-173, 187-191. 
No facts show that Terri Wilson's acts were due 
even in part to Plaintiff's statements. In fact, Wilson 
testified that she has never used Facebook, and no 
facts show she was aware of Plaintiff's statements 
about Weaver. Wilson's contemptuousness to Weaver, 
if any, has not been shown to have been related to the 
challenged statements made by Plaintiff. 
This leaves the sole proof of damage as Weaver's 
belief that people at work lost respect for him and no 
longer talk to him as much as they did before. A 
8
 The Court disregards all hearsay not shown to be justified 
by an exception. 
9
 Allegedly, when employee Terri Wilson refused Weaver's 
instruction to do a task, Weaver grabbed her arm and told her to 
do it. But the citation is to pages of Wilson's deposition (9-10) 
that are not included in the record. See Dk. 155, Wilson depo., 
including pages 1-4 and 45-48 only. 
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victim's own observations may be suitable as proof 
of harm to his reputation for defamation cases in 
Kansas, see Moran v. State, 267 Kan. 583, 985 P.2d 
127 (1999), but they must raise a reasonable infer- 
ence that the damage was caused by the plaintiff's 
statements. Yet Weaver fails to name any person who 
was aware of Plaintiff's derogatory comments and 
who talked to him less, and fails to identify any other 
way in which employees demonstrated any loss of 
respect for him. "Broad and factually unsupported 
allegations ... do not support a claim for damages 
for alleged defamation." Davis v. Hildyard, 34 
Kan.App.2d 22, 30, 113 P.3d 827 (2005) (finding 
insufficient proof of damages for defamation where 
physician testified that patients had canceled their 
appointments). 
Summary judgment is warranted on Weaver's 
claim of defamation for his failure to prove that any 
of Plaintiff's four statements damaged his reputa- 
tion. The Court finds it unnecessary to reach other 
questions, including whether those statements were 
substantially true. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant 
Mercy Health System of Kansas' (Mercy) motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment 
and retaliation claims (Dk. 146) is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant 
Leonard Weaver's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's assault and battery claim (Dk. 146) is 
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granted; and that Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment on Weaver's counterclaim for defamation 
(Dk. 144) is granted. 
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ORDER 
(Filed Jan. 16, 2014) 
Before KELLY, MURPHY and TYMKOVTCH, 
Circuit Judges. 
Sara C. Debord's petition for rehearing is denied. 
The petition for rehearing en banc was transmit- 
ted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular 
active service. As no member of the panel and no 
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judge in regular active service on the court requested 
that the court be polled, that petition is also denied. 
Entered for the Court 
/s/ Elisabeth A. Shumaker 
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